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Prosecutorial Discretion of the
Department of Justice in
Corporate Criminal Cases
HOW FAR IS TOO FAR?
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly common incidents of corporate scandal and
malfeasance have resulted in an unparalleled era of corporate crime.' The
crimes committed by executives and employees of corporations such as
Enron2 and Worldcom3 deprived hundreds of thousands of innocent
employees of their jobs4 or life savings.' The bankruptcy of the Enron
corporation alone resulted in losses to Enron employee pension plans of
approximately $1.2 billion.' The era of corporate malfeasance has also
I KENNETH R. GRAY ET AL., CORPORATE SCANDALS: THE MANY FACES OF GREED 1
(2005) ("[T]he twenty-first century has witnessed unprecedented corporate scandal, malfeasance,
and financial crisis."). The U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that in 2006, there were 217
sentences handed down against organizations for offenses in which "pecuniary loss or harm can be
more readily quantified, such as fraud, theft, and tax offenses." U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
2006 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2006). The number of such sentences in 2006 constituted a 16% increase
from 2005 and a 67% increase from 2004. Id. The most common offense committed by an
organization sentenced in federal court was fraud. Id. at 41 (Fraud accounted for 32.7% of the 217
cases sentenced.).
2 Enron was "one of the largest energy-producing and trading organizations in the
United States" prior to its final collapse in 2001. GRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 49. Enron executives
hid huge company losses through "highly complicated financial engineering, convoluted
partnerships, off-balance-sheet debt, and exotic hedging techniques." Id. In addition, when the
hidden losses became public, "company managers sold millions of dollars in company stock while
prohibiting their employees from selling theirs," thus causing immense losses to innocent company
employees. Id.
3 WorldCom, a telecommunications company, was the nation's second-largest long-
distance carrier in June 2002. Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses,
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al. The company admitted that "it
had overstated its cash flow by more than $3.8 billion during the last five quarters." Id. The
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed fraud charges against WorldCom on June 26,
2002 for the falsely reported profits. Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Overview;
WorldCom Facing Charges of Fraud; Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at Al.
4 GRAY ET AL., supra note I, at 63 ("More than five hundred thousand telecom workers
lost their jobs since 2000.").
5 Id. at 2 ("Many loyal workers who had invested in company 401(k)s, pensions, and
mutual funds had seen their life savings wiped out.").
6 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 106 (2006) (The bankruptcy of the Enron corporation "was
claimed to have resulted in [total] losses of $1.2 billion to Enron employee pension plans. The
employees' actual out-of-pocket loss, as measured by their personal cash contributions plus some
moderate rate of return, is unknown.").
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caused a significant loss of investor confidence in the financial market
and a strong distrust of corporations and their leaders.'
Prosecution of corporate crimes is crucial to protect employees
and investors, as well as to restore confidence in corporate leaders and
the financial market. In response to criminal conduct committed by
corporations and their employees since the Enron scandal in 2001,8 the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") revised its standards for the prosecution
of corporations when an employee has committed an illegal act that
somehow benefited the corporation.9 After Enron, the DOJ standards
were set out in the Thompson Memorandum, ° which revised the Holder
Memorandum established in 1999." The Thompson Memorandum
provided detailed methods and practices for DOJ prosecutors to use in
prosecuting corporations and individuals accused of corporate crimes.1 2
From 2002 to 2006, federal prosecutors brought charges against more
than 200 chief executive officers, company presidents, and chief
financial officers, and obtained more than 1000 convictions or guilty
pleas in white collar cases. 3 In 2007, the DOJ revised the Thompson
Memorandum and issued the McNulty Memorandum, which established
the new DOJ policy regarding prosecution of corporate crimes. 4 This
new policy was created after members of the corporate legal community
complained that DOJ practices regarding prosecution of corporations
were impeding corporate employees' ability to fully and frankly
communicate with legal counsel. 5 As a result of further criticism of DOJ
practices after the implementation of the McNulty Memorandum, on
7 GRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
8 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9 Introduction to Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads
of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations 1 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Introduction to McNulty Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf; Memorandum from Larry D.
Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 1 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/business-organizations.pdf. The
Thompson Memorandum replaced the Holder Memorandum from June 16, 1999, which provided the
"factors that should be considered in deciding whether to institute criminal charges against a
corporation." Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999)
[hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available at httpJ/vww.afda.org/afda/news/agency-doj-orp.htrL"
For details regarding the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda, see Parts lI.C.1 and H.C.2
respectively.
10 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9.
11 Holder Memorandum, supra note 9.
12 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9.
13 Paul Davies & Kara Scannell, Guilty Verdicts Provide "Red Meat" to Prosecutors
Chasing Companies, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at Al.
14 Introduction to McNulty Memorandum, supra note 9. For changes made to the
Thompson Memorandum in the McNulty Memorandum see Part III.C.2.
15 Introduction to McNulty Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
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August 28, 2008 Deputy Attorney General Filip announced revised
guidelines ("Filip Guidelines") for criminal prosecution of corporations. 6
Prosecutors have wide discretion to determine whether to
prosecute individuals and corporations accused of criminal wrongdoing.
However, in the arena of corporate criminal liability, the DOJ may have
taken prosecutorial discretion too far. In determining whether to
prosecute corporations for the illegal act of their employees under the
McNulty Memorandum, the DOJ has taken into account the
corporation's cooperation in the investigation, which includes the
corporation's response to a DOJ request to waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege. 7 Although this is merely a "request" for waiver
of privileges, the DOJ policy has, in effect, perpetuated the culture of
waiver created under the Thompson Memorandum, whereby a
corporation must cooperate by granting the DOJ request of waiver or
face indictment. Due to market pressures encountered by a corporation, 8
indictment even without conviction generally means the death of the
corporation. 9 Therefore, the DOJ's policy of pressured waiver has placed
undue pressure on corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege
and turn over confidential communications between its employees and
corporate counsel upon DOJ request.2" Although the DOJ recently
announced new guidelines for the prosecution of corporate criminals that
provide greater protection to the corporate attorney-client privilege,2' it is
unlikely that these revisions will remedy the current culture of waiver
created by the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda.
This Note will argue that, consistent with principles of justice
and the reasoning developed by the court in United States v. Stein (Stein
16 Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
9-28.000 (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Guidelines], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf. For details regarding the Filip Guidelines, see Part H.C.3.
17 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 4, 9-
10 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeechesl2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf ("A corporation's response to the
government's request for waiver of privilege for Category I information may be considered in
determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the government's investigation," and
"[p]rosecutors may always favorably consider a corporation's acquiescence to the government's
waiver request in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the government's
investigation.").
18 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 73 (2007)
(Corporations are inherently vulnerable and "corporate defendants, subject as they are to market
pressures, may not be able to survive indictment, much less conviction and sentencing.").
19 See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 n.ll (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
aft'd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[N]o major financial services firm has ever survived a criminal
indictment."); Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of
2002-03, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 471-76 (2004) ("[A]n indicted firm is a dead firm .... ). As
Oesterle observes, for certain businesses, "the damage is done with the indictment" and
"[v]indication, if gained at trial, comes far too late for many in this community." Id. at 472.
20 Oesterle, supra note 19, at 477-78.
21 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.700-720.
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1),22 courts should find prosecutorial pressure on corporations to waive
their attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional because it fails strict
scrutiny analysis. Even if the courts do not find DOJ pressure on
corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege to be
unconstitutional, pressured waiver should be rejected as unnecessary and
harmful to corporations, employees, and shareholders. Furthermore, this
Note will propose that the proper method of remedying the culture of
waiver is legislation that prohibits the government from requesting
corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege or from giving any
consideration to a corporation's waiver of attorney-client privilege in its
decision to indict the corporation. Although the Filip Guidelines
announced August 28, 2008 are an improvement from the McNulty
Memorandum, this Note argues that they offer only a temporary solution
and are not enough to cure the current culture of waiver. 3
Part II of this Note will introduce the basis of prosecutorial
discretion, as well as explain the history and current standard for
corporate criminal liability. Part II will also discuss attorney-client
privilege in general, and the effect of the DOJ policy on this privilege.
Part III will examine why the DOJ policy and practice of pressuring
corporations to waive their corporate attorney-client privilege should be
rejected as unconstitutional, unnecessary, and harmful to corporations,
corporate employees, and shareholders. Part III will also discuss the
implications of the court's decision in Stein I, and its impact on the
DOJ's pressure on corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege.
Finally, Part IV will explore potential solutions to the problem of
protecting a corporation's privileges, while simultaneously meeting the
DOJ's goal of investigating and punishing criminal conduct by
corporations and corporate employees.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DOJ Prosecution of Corporations and Employees Accused of
Criminal Corporate Wrongdoing
During the Enron scandal, in addition to losing his job, one
Enron employee's 401(k) investments "drop[ped] from $1.3 million to
22 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
23 See generally Filip Guidelines, supra note 16; Statement of H. Thomas Wells Jr.,
ABA President, New U.S. Dep't of Justice Corp. Charging Guidelines (Aug. 28. 2008) [hereinafter
ABA President Wells Statement], available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/
statement.cfm?releaseid=437 (ABA President H. Thomas Wells Jr. argued that "[u]nlike legislation,
guidelines can provide no certainty that critical attorney-client privilege, work product, and
employee constitutional rights will be protected in the future. These bedrock legal rights are
sacrosanct and must not be dependent on the personal leanings of each new deputy attorney
general."). In addition, the new Filip Guidelines only apply to the Justice Department, and "do[]
nothing to change the similar policies adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or the
informal waiver practices of many other agencies." Id.
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$8,200 when the company declared bankruptcy."'24 Another employee's
retirement account "dropped from $485,000 to $22,000 before she sold
the stock. '2 5 In addition, the corporate criminal wrongdoing by Enron
executives resulted in significant losses for other Americans whose
401(k) accounts were invested in the Enron corporation. 26 These and
other losses sustained by working Americans from a series of corporate
scandals since 2001 have resulted in a loss of confidence in corporations
and the financial market.27
In this post-Enron era of corporate fraud and wrongdoing, the
DOJ must forcefully prosecute corporations and corporate employees
who are guilty of committing illegal acts that somehow benefit the
corporation. Such prosecution is necessary to protect the public and to
restore confidence in corporations and the financial market.28 The DOJ
defines corporations as "'legal persons,' capable of suing and being sued,
and capable of committing crimes. '"29 Under the torts doctrine of
respondeat superior," "a corporation may be held criminally liable for
the illegal acts of its directors, officers, employees, and agents."'" "To
hold a corporation liable for these [illegal acts], the government must
establish that the corporate agent's actions (i) were within the scope of
his duties, and (ii) were intended, at least in part, to benefit the
corporation. '"32
24 MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 105.
25 Id. at 106.
26 Id. at 106-07. Markham observes that
[slome 42 million Americans held 401(k) accounts at 350,000 employers and had $2
trillion invested at the time of Enron's collapse. At the end of June 2002, the value of
those accounts had dropped to $1.3 trillion. Employees at Intel, the computer chip maker,
saw the value of their holdings of Intel stock drop $366 million in 2002. Lucent
Corporation employees had as much as 80 percent of their assets in Section 401(k)
accounts invested in that company's stock as its price declined by over 90 percent
between 1999 and 2001. Forty percent of assets held in Polaroid's Section 401(k)
accounts were invested in that company's stock at the time of its bankruptcy.
Id.
27 GRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 2 (Since the Enron scandal in 2001, there has been a loss
of investor confidence in the financial market and a strong distrust of corporations and their
leaders.).
28 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.29 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.200(B); Holder Memorandum, supra note 9,
at 2; McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
30 The rule of respondeat superior and the doctrine of collective knowledge have
established the standard that a corporation is criminally liable even if the corporation had reasonable
policies in place to prevent the criminal conduct, the corporation had no knowledge or notice of the
criminal conduct, "the criminal activity was performed by a low-level employee[,] the primary
purpose was to benefit only the ... employee... no single individual had the requisite intent or
knowledge sufficient to violate the law[,]" or a reasonable corporation would not have known of the
criminal conduct. Bharara, supra note 18, at 64-65.
31 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.200(B); Holder Memorandum, supra note 9,
at 2; McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.
32 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.200(B); Holder Memorandum, supra note 9,
at 2; McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.
There is ongoing discussion within corporate and academic arenas questioning the harshness of this
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In accordance with these principles, and in the wake of the 2001
Enron Scandal,33 the DOJ created a standard for corporate criminal
liability in an effort to punish wrongdoers and protect the investing
public. 4 This DOJ standard for prosecution of corporate crimes was
initially expressed in the Thompson Memorandum,35 later in the revised
McNulty Memorandum,36 and recently in the DOJ guidelines announced
by Deputy Attorney General Mark R. Filip on August 28, 2008."7 From
2001 through 2007, facilitated by the Thompson and then McNulty
Memoranda, the DOJ obtained over "1,200 corporate fraud convictions
and recovered billions of dollars for investors and shareholders. 38 While
the government's interest in prosecuting corporations and corporate
employees guilty of criminal wrongdoing is undoubtedly important, it
must be balanced with the right, protected by the attorney-client
privilege, of corporate employees to fully and frankly communicate with
legal counsel.39
B. Importance of Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Context
Attorney-client privilege applies to both individual clients and
corporations.' The privilege is a result of balancing the need for
disclosure in criminal cases against the social interest in protecting
confidentiality and encouraging attorney-client communications." The
standard for corporate criminal liability upon corporations. See, e.g., John A. Tancabel, Reflections
on the McNulty Memorandum, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 219 (2007).
33 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
34 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.
35 Id. The Thompson Memorandum was created in 2003, and expressed the DOJ's policy
of prosecuting corporations whose employee(s) acted illegally with intent, at least in part, to benefit
the compay. Id. at 1-2.
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17. The McNulty Memorandum was implemented
in 2007 as a revision of the Thompson Memorandum and in response to complaints by the corporate
legal community that DOJ practices under the Thompson Memorandum "may [have] be[en]
discouraging full and candid communications between corporate employees and legal counsel." Id.
at 1.
37 Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting
Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28. 2008), available at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2008/AugustlO8-odag-
757.html; Filip Guidelines, supra note 16.
38 Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client
Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 1 10th
Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter McNulty Hearings] (statement of Karin Immergut, U.S. Attorney,
District of Oregon).
39 American Civil Liberties Union Welcomes Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act,
U.S. FED. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2006) (noting that the right of all individuals to speak freely and frankly
with their attorneys "is fundamental and vital to the court system").
40 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981); United States v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
41 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ArrORNEY-CLtENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DoCTINE 13 (5th ed. 2007); JoHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ArrORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE
1-6 (Garland Law Publishing 1987) (finding courts have based their holdings in attorney-client
context cases on "interests of justice: to encourage client communication with counsel and to provide
all relevant facts to the decision-maker").
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purpose of attorney-client protection is to "encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. 42 The rationale behind full disclosure is based upon the lawyer's
need to be fully informed by her client in order to provide fair and proper
representation."3 In addition, the attorney-client privilege facilitates
voluntary compliance with regulatory laws, which leads to effective
administration of the laws.'
Attorney-client privilege is particularly important to corporations
in order to ensure that employees feel free to discuss issues with
corporate counsel and to gain advice and guidance regarding conduct at
work. The proper functioning of the privilege directly impacts the
corporation's ability to assist in criminal investigations of their
employees and to implement proper compliance programs to prevent
future corporate misconduct.45 The attorney-client privilege in the
corporate sector exists between the corporation and corporate counsel.'
There is no duty between corporate counsel and the individual employees
of the corporation.47 Nonetheless, all discussions relevant to legal matters
within the corporation between the corporate counsel and employees of
the corporation are protected under the attorney-client privilege."
42 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. The right of all individuals to speak freely and frankly with
their attorneys "is fundamental and vital to the court system," and "[p]reserving the right to counsel
allows all Americans the opportunity to protect themselves and others." American Civil Liberties
Union Welcomes Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, supra note 39.
43 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (explaining that the attorney-client privilege "exists to protect
not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice").
44 This voluntary compliance with the laws is facilitated through the promotion of a
client's freedom of consultation with his attorney. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 8. Without a client's
freedom to communicate freely with her attorney, attorneys would be less able to provide advice to
clients regarding requirements of the law, and this would consequently "diminish the ability of
attorneys to urge clients to follow the law." EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 8.
45 See Tancabel, supra note 32, at 221 ("[E]rosion of the [attorney-client] privilege
inhibits frank communications between employees and company counsel and therefore deters
corporate compliance with the law."). The problem arises when employees no longer speak freely to
corporate counsel because they are aware of the possibility of waiver, which would result in the
information the employee shared with corporate counsel being provided to the prosecutor. This
generally prevents corporations from conducting successful internal investigations, which
consequently restricts the ability of a corporation to fix the harm done by the wrongdoing and to
prevent the harm from occurring in the future.
46 The default rule is that corporate counsel represents the corporation, not the individual.
EPSTEIN, SuTPra note 41, at 164.
Although there is no duty between corporate counsel and the corporation's employees,
if corporate counsel believes an employee may have personal liability, professional ethics may
require the corporate counsel to give a "Miranda" warning to inform the employee of his right to
separate counsel and to ensure that the individual understands he is not personally represented by
corporate counsel, before corporate counsel questions the employee on any matters related to the
corporation. Id. at 165. An individual's subjective belief that he was personally represented by
corporate counsel is not sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship, thus no privilege will
attach to the individual's communication with corporate counsel. Id.
48 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95. The Upjohn court found that the attorney-client privilege
can extend to middle-level and lower-level employees because these employees have the relevant
information required by corporate counsel to adequately assess risks and provide complete and
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However, if the corporation waives its attorney-client privilege,4 9 it
waives all information provided by the employees and officers of the
corporation to corporate counsel, unless the officer or employee can
show he consulted with corporate counsel in an individual capacity
instead of as an officer of the corporation." Accordingly, if the culture of
waiver continues, employees will be less likely to discuss any potential
employee wrongdoing with corporate counsel because the employee will
know their conversations will likely be disclosed to prosecutors when the
corporation waives its attorney-client privilege. 1 Thus, this Note
demonstrates that corporate attorney-client privilege must be protected to
ensure that employees continue to disclose information regarding
employee misconduct to the corporation. These disclosures will enable
the corporation to improve compliance programs and prevent future
criminal activity by its employees. Protection of the corporate attorney-
intelligent advice to the corporate client. Id. at 391 ("[I]t is only natural that [middle-level-and
lower-level] employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is
adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.").
49 Only the corporation's management, which is normally its officers and directors, may
waive the corporate attorney-client privilege. Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. 343, 349 n.5 (1985). Furthermore, when a board of directors determines that the
corporation will not waive the attorney-client privilege, an individual director cannot waive the
privilege. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 29.
50 EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 155; United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840, 842-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Where a former trustee of the corporate board did not show he consulted corporate
counsel in an individual capacity rather than in his official capacity as a corporate board member, the
trustee could not assert the attorney-client privilege on his own behalf.). The default assumption is
that a corporate officer or employee is consulting with corporate counsel in the capacity of an officer
of the corporation rather than in an individual capacity. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 157. An
employee or corporate officer must prove five factors in order to claim a personal privilege for
communications with the corporate counsel, and thus prevent the corporation's attorney-client
privilege waiver from consequently waiving the personal privileged communications of the
individual employee or officer. These five factors are that the employee must show: (1) he
approached corporate counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice; (2) he made clear that he was
seeking advice not as a corporate representative, but as an individual employee; (3) the corporate
counsel knew a conflict could arise but still spoke with the employee in the employee's individual
capacity; (4) the conversations the employee engaged in with the corporate counsel were
confidential; and (5) the substance of the conversations between himself and the corporate counsel
"did not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the company." In re Bevill,
805 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 155 (summarizing these
required factors). See infra Part III.B.2.
51 See Tancabel, supra note 32, at 221. In Upjohn, the court found that "if the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected" and "[a]n uncertain
privilege.. . is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. Thus if the "purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is to be served," it cannot be probable that the conversations between
employee and corporate counsel will not be protected. Id.; see also ABA Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 60 Bus. LAW. 1029, 1037 (2005) [hereinafter ABA Report on Attorney-Client
Privilege] ("If a client fears that information revealed to his attorney will be made known to others,
then the client will withhold information and the attorney will be left with less than all of the
information needed to provide competent legal advice."); Introduction to McNulty Memorandum,
supra note 9, at I ("Many of those associated with the corporate legal community have expressed
concern that [DOJ] practices may be discouraging full and candid communications between
corporate employees and legal counsel. . . . Therefore, [the DOJ has] decided to adjust certain
aspects of [its] policy .... ").
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client privilege must be balanced, however, with the need for the
stringent prosecution of corporate criminal wrongdoers.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Culture of Waiver
Prosecutors have broad discretion in investigating individuals
and corporations accused of criminal wrongdoing. Prosecutors also
decide whether to prosecute individual or corporate clients.2 They
negotiate plea agreements for criminal defendants in exchange for
valuable information or for conservation of government resources.
53
Prosecutorial discretion, used in various criminal contexts, is crucial to
properly allocate resources for criminal prosecutions and to ensure that
the true legislative goals of criminal statutes are met. 4 Prosecutors can,
and often do, negotiate the waiver of an individual's Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent55 in exchange for leniency in prosecution.56
Similarly, prosecutorial discretion is used in the investigation
and prosecution of corporations accused of criminal wrongdoing."
However, unlike an individual's waiver of her Fourth or Fifth
Amendment rights, which must be done "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently,"58 the DOJ policy and the existing culture of waiver
pressure corporations to turn over confidential communications between
employees of the corporation and corporate counsel without the consent
of the individual employees involved. When an individual waives her
constitutional right to remain silent or to counsel, she waives only her
52 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion."). This discretion results from "the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985). But this prosecutorial discretion is limited by the Constitution. Id. at 608.
53 Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 627-28
(1999).
54 Id. at 627. The legislature drafts broad criminal statutes to criminalize certain
behavior, but prosecutors use their expertise to prosecute only certain potential defendants in order
to "maximize the benefit of limited law enforcement resources and achieve individualized justice."
Id. at 627-28; see also Paul M. Secunda, Note, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing
Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutions Through the Use of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1997) (discussing the expansion of the
Prosecutor's role in sentencing since the Federal Guidelines were put in place).
55 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person. .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ).
56 Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 570 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is
fully appropriate to encourage [cooperation with the authorities] by offering leniency in exchange
for 'cooperation."'). Furthermore, "a confession made in the hope of leniency does not invalidate a
resulting confession ...." Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda is Not Prophylactic
and the Constitution is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 611 n.140 (2007). Also, "when a
defendant elects to waive his right to remain silent and testify at trial, he does so under the threat that
the prosecution's case, if left unrebutted, will likely result in conviction." Id. at 596.
57 See infra Part H.C.1.
58 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (waiver of right to remain silent).
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own right. In contrast, a corporation that waives its attorney-client
privilege simultaneously provides the prosecution with confidential
communications between all employees and corporate counsel, unless
the employee can prove she met with corporate counsel in an individual
capacity.59
Until the recent revisions to the DOJ policy for prosecution of
corporate criminal activity,60 prosecutorial discretion in the corporate
arena was guided by the McNulty Memorandum, 6' which established that
the DOJ may choose not to indict a corporation if it determines that the
corporation cooperated with prosecutors during their investigation.62 The
McNulty Memorandum revised the previous policy, which was
established in the Thompson Memorandum.63  The McNulty
Memorandum was implemented in response to concerns by the corporate
legal community that DOJ practices under the Thompson Memorandum
were "discouraging full and candid communications between corporate
employees and legal counsel."'  The Filip Guidelines announced by the
DOJ on August 28, 2008 were implemented due to similar concerns
about the McNulty Memorandum. 5
1. Thompson Memorandum
The Thompson Memorandum was issued in 2003 to establish the
DOJ's policy of prosecuting corporations whose employee(s) acted
illegally and, in doing so, somehow benefited the company.' The
Thompson Memorandum provided that, in deciding whether to indict a
corporation, the prosecutor should weigh all factors normally considered
in the exercise of prosecutorial judgment,67 as well as, inter alia, consider
the corporation's willingness to cooperate in the DOJ's investigation.65
59 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
60 See generally Filip Guidelines, supra note 16.
61 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17.
62 Id. at 4, 7 (prosecutors may consider several "factors in determining whether to charge
a corporation" including the corporation's "willingness to cooperate in the investigation").63 See generally id.
64 Introduction to McNulty Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
65 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.710 (prefacing its change in policy with the
assertion that "the contention, from a broad array of voices, is that the Department's position on
attorney-client privilege and work product protection waivers has promoted an environment in which
those protections are being unfairly eroded to the detriment of all").
66 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
67 Factors normally considered in the exercise of prosecutorial judgment include: "the
sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative,
and other consequences of conviction; and the adequacy of noncriminal approaches." Id. at 2.
68 Id. at 3-4. In addition, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide that lenience is
appropriate for a business entity if the business reports an offense
prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and ... within a
reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, [the business] reported the
offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and
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The corporation's waiver of attorney-client privilege, if deemed
necessary by the DOJ, was considered in the DOJ's determination of the
corporation's cooperation with prosecutors.69  The Thompson
Memorandum maintained that, in exchange for cooperation, prosecutors
may agree not to prosecute the corporation.7" Specifically, when a
corporation's "timely cooperation" seems "necessary to the public
interest" and there are no other available or effective "means of obtaining
the desired cooperation," a prosecutor may forgo prosecution.71 This
"credit" or leniency for cooperation72 is similar to that of a natural person
who may be given immunity, lesser charges, or sentencing
considerations "for turning [herself] in, making statements against [her]
clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its
criminal conduct....
2007 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(g)(1)(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2007guid/8c25.htm.
69 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7 ("One factor the prosecutor may weigh in
assessing the adequacy of a corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including,
if necessarT a waiver of the attorney-client ... protection[] ....").
Id. at 6-8 (Although "a corporation's offer of cooperation does not automatically
entitle it to immunity from prosecution," non-prosecution agreements are permitted "in exchange for
cooperation when a corporation's timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public interest
and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 5-6.
72 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in determining a culpability score for a
convicted corporation, a sentencing court will consider the nature and seriousness of the
corporation's conduct, whether "high level personnel" were involved in the wrongful conduct, and
whether the "high level personnel" condoned, participated in, or willfully ignored the behavior.
Stephen James Binkak, When Everything Goes Wrong: How the Federal Government Decides
Whether to Prosecute a Business Organization and How the Courts Determine Punishment, A.L.I.
349, 356 (Nov. 18-20, 2004). If these circumstances are present, then points will be added to the
basic score, which results in a more severe sentence. Id. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
also allow for leniency or "credit" for certain things, which results in a less severe sentence.
According to § 8C2.5, in determining the culpability score for sentencing of organizations, the court
should start with five points and then increase or decrease the culpability score according to several
factors. 2007 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(a), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/8c2_5.htmil. The score is increased if, among other things, "an
individual within high-level personnel of the organization participated in, condoned, or was willfully
ignorant of the offense[,]" the "tolerance of the offense by substantial authority personnel was
pervasive throughout the organization[,]" id. § 8C2.5(b), and if there was prior history of "a criminal
adjudication based on similar misconduct." Id. § 8C2.5(c). Two points are subtracted from an
organization's culpability score "[i]f the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and
clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal
conduct[.]" Id. § 8C2.5(g)(2). Five points will be subtracted from the organization's culpability score
if in addition to full cooperation in the investigation and "recognition and affirmative acceptance of
responsibility for its criminal conduct," the organization did so "prior to an imminent threat of
disclosure or government investigation; and .. .within a reasonably prompt time after becoming
aware of the offense, [and the organization also] reported the offense to the appropriate
governmental authorities." Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). Therefore, if the corporation wants to be granted either
the five point or two point decrease in its culpability score for sentencing, it will do everything
possible to "fully cooperate." Thus, similar to the pressure felt by the corporation to waive its
attorney-client privilege to avoid indictment by the DOJ, the corporation is given comparable
pressure to waive its privilege in order to "fully cooperate" and obtain the decrease in its culpability
score for sentencing under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17,
at 8; 2007 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8C2.5(g)(2).
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penal interest, [or] cooperating in the government's investigation of [her]
own and others' wrongdoing...."'I
Thus, the Thompson Memorandum made the corporation's
cooperation during a government investigation an important factor in the
DOJ's decision of whether to indict the firm.74 The sufficiency of the
corporation's cooperation in the investigation was determined partially
by the corporation's grant of the DOJ's requested waiver of attorney-
client privilege. 5 The corporation would thereby have to waive its
attorney-client privilege in order to fully cooperate with the government.
Therefore, the DOJ policy under the Thompson Memorandum made
granting the DOJ's request for waiver of attorney-client privilege
essentially a necessity for the corporation's survival, as indictment
generally means failure of the company.76
As a result, a culture of waiver was created under the Thompson
Memorandum whereby corporations felt obligated to waive their
attorney-client privilege in order to avoid indictment by the DOJ.
Furthermore, corporations began waiving their attorney-client privilege
before the DOJ officially requested such waiver because of implied
pressure on corporations to either waive or face indictment.77 The culture
of waiver that developed eventually resulted in the implementation of the
McNulty Memorandum, which revised the DOJ policy as embodied in
the Thompson Memorandum.78
2. McNulty Memorandum
In the years following the implementation of the Thompson
Memorandum, pressure began to mount from the legal community to
change existing DOJ practices as they were negatively affecting
corporate employees' ability to fully and frankly communicate with legal
73 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 9, at 4.
74 Id. at 3 (listing one of the nine factors to be considered by prosecutors in "reaching a
decision as to the proper treatment of a corporate target" as the corporation's "willingness to
cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-
client and work product protection").
75 Id.
76 Lauren E. Taigue, Justice Department's Policy on Corporate Prosecutions Under
Attack: United States v. Stein Assails Thompson Memorandum, 52 VILL. L. REV. 369, 369-70 (2007);
see also Bharara, supra note 18, at 73 (Due to market pressures, corporate defendants "may not be
able to survive indictment, much less conviction and sentencing."); Oesterle, supra note 19, at 471-
78 (describing the pressure felt by a company facing indictment by stating that "[s]ince an indicted
firm is a dead firm, a decision to defend an indictment is suicide.").
77 As evidenced by more than forty recent cases, as a result of the "culture of waiver"
that has been established through DOJ policy and tactics, it is no longer necessary for the DOJ to
demand waiver of privileges. Editorial, Abuse of Privilege, WALL ST. J, Sept. 20, 2007, at A 12. This
is because companies "read between the lines" and waive their privileges in accordance with what
prosecutors want "for fear that the alternative [ils indictment." Id.
78 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17.
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counsel.79 As a result, the DOJ revised the Thompson Memorandum. In
2007, the DOJ provided its new policy regarding the prosecution of
corporate crimes in the McNulty Memorandum.8" In the McNulty
Memorandum, the DOJ argued that a corporation's disclosure of
privileged information could allow the government to expedite its
investigation and might be critical in enabling the government to
evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the company's voluntary
disclosure.81 The McNulty Memorandum also granted prosecutors "wide
latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute
for violations of federal criminal law. 8 2
In contrast to the Thompson Memorandum, the McNulty
Memorandum provided that waiver of attorney-client privilege was not a
prerequisite to a DOJ finding that a corporation had cooperated in the
government's investigation. 3  Further unlike the Thompson
Memorandum, the McNulty Memorandum established that prosecutors
may only request a waiver of attorney-client privilege where there was a
"legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law
enforcement obligations."'  Whether there is a legitimate need depends
79 Introduction to McNulty Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1 ("Many of those associated
with the corporate legal community have expressed concern that [DOJI practices may be
discouraging full and candid communications between corporate employees and legal counsel ...
[t]herefore [the DOJ has] decided to adjust certain aspects of [its] policy .... ").
80 Id. at 2. Some argue that the McNulty Memorandum did not actually change the
majority of the substance of the Thompson Memorandum since it maintained: mandatory
consideration of the nine factors by prosecutors in determining whether to indict a corporation, the
fundamental emphasis on corporate cooperation, and the DOJ's support of its current corporate
criminal liability standard. Bharara, supra note 18, at 78.
81 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8. In the McNulty Memorandum, the DOJ
also stated that by prosecuting corporate crimes, the DOJ "plays an important role in protecting
investors and ensuring public confidence in business entities and in the investment markets in which
those entities participate." Id. at 1.
82 Id. at 5. While this leaves a lot to prosecutorial discretion, such discretion is used for
all criminal cases. Prosecutors choose who to prosecute and who not to prosecute, so the standard is
not any harsher simply because it is in the context of corporate crime.
83 Id. at 8 (providing that "[wlaiver of attorney-client and work product protections is not
a prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated in the government's investigation").
84 Id. The McNulty Memorandum creates two categories of information regarding
waivers of privileged information. Id. at 9-10. Category I includes factual information relating to the
underlying misconduct. Id. at 9. This could include copies of key documents, witness statements, or
purely factual interview memoranda regarding the underlying misconduct. Id. Prosecutors may
consider a corporation's response to the government's request for waiver of privilege for Category I
information in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the government's investigation
and thus if the corporation should be indicted. Id. Prosecutors must obtain written authorization from
the United States Attorney before requesting that a corporation waive the attorney-client or work
product protections for Category I information. Id. Category H includes attorney-client
communications and non-factual attorney work product, including legal advice given to the
corporation before, during, and after the underlying misconduct occurred. Id. at 10. The McNulty
Memorandum states that this information should only be requested if the purely factual information
provides an incomplete basis to conduct a thorough investigation. Id. In order to obtain a waiver for
Category n information, the prosecutor must obtain written authorization from the Deputy Attorney
General, and in the U.S. Attorney's request for approval to request a waiver of privileged
information, the U.S. Attorney must set forth a legitimate need for the information and identify the
scope of the waiver sought. Id.
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on: (1) the probability that "the privileged information will benefit the
government's investigation;" (2) whether there are alternative means of
obtaining the same information in a timely manner; (3) the
"completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided;" and (4) the
effect of the waiver on the corporation. 5
Although the McNulty Memorandum changed the DOJ standard
to no longer require the corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege
in order for the government to find that the corporation cooperated,86 the
culture of waiver created under the Thompson Memorandum resulted in
the current trend of corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege even
without a DOJ request to do so." This culture of waiver persisted in the
wake of the McNulty Memorandum as the corporation still perceived
undue pressure to waive the attorney-client privilege in order to show
cooperation with the DOJ and thus avoid indictment.88
For Category I information,89 which includes only factual
information,9" the McNulty Memorandum provided that the DOJ may
consider the corporation's response to a DOJ request for waiver of
privilege in determining whether the corporation cooperated in the
85 Id. at 9.
86 Id. at 8 ("Waiver of attorney-client and work product protections is not a prerequisite
to a finding that a company has cooperated in the government's investigation.").
7 At a Congressional hearing on September 18, 2007 regarding Arlen Spector's
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, the DOJ reported that since DOJ policy was
modified through the McNulty Memorandum, the DOJ had only demanded a corporation waive its
attorney-client privilege four times for factual information and requested no waivers of privilege for
attorney-client communications. McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 5 (statement of Karin
Immergut, U.S. Attorney, District of Oregon). However, as a result of the "culture of waiver," and as
evidenced by more than forty recent cases, companies often waive their attorney-client privilege
even without a DOJ request to do so, "for fear that the alternative [i]s indictment." Abuse of
Privilege, supra note 77, at A12. This is because companies "read between the lines" and waive their
privileges in accordance with what prosecutors want "for fear that the alternative [i]s indictment." Id.
Furthermore, "Norman Veasey, former Chief Judge of the Delaware Supreme Court, submitted to
the committee a roster of cases in which prosecutors have continued to run roughshod over attorney-
client privilege and defendants' rights" even after implementation of the McNulty Memorandum.
Id.; see also John Diedrich, Coupon Case Could Expand: Indictment Alleging Intimidation,
Obstruction to be Sought in Scam, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2007, at Al (reporting that
prosecutors dropped International Outsourcing Services from its investigation for defrauding
manufacturers and stores of at least $250 million over a decade, after the company agreed "to fire
several of the defendants and waive attorney-client privilege on thousands of pages of documents.").
88 See United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(Corporations that face indictment "must do whatever [they] can to avoid indictment" or face
consequences such as that of Arthur Anderson & Co.). Corporate indictment also "threatens to
destroy the business regardless of whether the firm ultimately is convicted or acquitted." Id. A
common example of this phenomenon is the collapse of Arthur Anderson & Co. almost immediately
after it was indicted. Id. The Supreme Court's reversal of the corporation's conviction did not
reverse the damage done by the indictment. Id.
89 See supra note 84.
90 Factual information in Category I "could include, without limitation, copies of key
documents, witness statements, or purely factual interview memoranda regarding the underlying
misconduct, organization charts created by company counsel, factual chronologies, factual
summaries, or reports (or portions thereof) containing investigative facts documented by counsel."
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 9.
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government investigation.9 Furthermore, the McNulty Memorandum
stated that prosecutors must not consider a refusal by the corporation to
waive protection to privileged information against the corporation for
Category II information, which includes attorney-client communications
and non-factual attorney work product.92 However, the McNulty
Memorandum also provided that prosecutors may still "favorably
consider" a corporation's waiver of attorney-client privilege in response
to the government's request, in determining whether the corporation has
cooperated in the DOJ's investigation.93 This Note argues that if
prosecutors can favorably consider a corporation's waiver of privilege,
then it follows that failure to provide a requested waiver may negatively
affect the corporation's likelihood of avoiding indictment.9' Thus, the
language in the McNulty Memorandum was not strong enough to protect
the corporation from negative consideration by prosecutors if it refused
to waive protection to privileged information. As prosecutors were
allowed to use refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege as a factor in
determining whether the corporation cooperated, and thus whether the
corporation should be indicted, the waiver was not truly voluntary."
91 Id. ("A corporation's response to the government's request for waiver of privilege for
Category I information may be considered in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in
the government's investigation.").
92 Id. at 10 ("If a corporation declines to provide waiver for Category H information after
a written request from the United States Attorney, prosecutors must not consider this declination
against the corporation in making a charging decision."); see also supra note 84.
93 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 10. ("Prosecutors may always favorably
consider a corporation's acquiescence to the government's waiver request in determining whether a
corporation has cooperated in the government's investigation."); see also Tancabel, supra note 32, at
2 ("As long as the DOJ continues to grant cooperation points to companies that voluntarily waive the
privilege in the absence of a written request to do so, companies are likely to continue to waive the
privilege at the beginning of a criminal investigation.").
94 In addition, there have been complaints that the DOJ has not done enough to prevent
prosecutors from demanding waiver of attorney-client privilege by corporations. Pamela A.
MacLean, The Year of Living Dangerously For CGS, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 5 ("Defense
lawyers have complained that the Justice Department has not sufficiently discouraged prosecutors
from demanding-as a sign of cooperation-the waiver of attorney-client privilege information and
access to results of internal company investigations."). Furthermore, there are allegations that
prosecutors ignore the provisions of the McNulty Memorandum and instead continue to pressure
corporations to waive important privileges. Marcia Coyle, Efforts to Protect Privilege Falling Short,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 2007, at 6 ("'The behaviors ingrained in pre-McNulty remain ingrained post-
McNulty and the memo hasn't removed those practices."' (quoting Susan Hackett, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel of the Association of Corporate Counsel)). For example, allegedly
when an East Coast corporation was being investigated for fraud after the implementation of the
McNulty Memorandum and the company counsel raised the McNulty Memorandum procedures in a
discussion with the prosecutor, the prosecutor's response was "'I don't give a flying - -' about the
policy and said the burden was on the company to 'appeal' the waiver request up the Justice Dept.
chain of command." Id. Furthermore, "[b]usiness groups say McNulty's revisions have not stopped
prosecutorial abuses." Bill McConnell, Spector Bill Would Curb Prosecutors, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 19,
2007. Thus, "although the theory of the McNulty Memorandum is a good one, in practice, individual
prosecutors interpret its factors markedly differently" because there has been little training of
prosecutors to act according to the provisions of the McNulty Memorandum. McNulty Hearings,
supra note 38, at 17 (statement of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block).
95 See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affid,
541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Few if any competent defense lawyers would advise a corporate client
at risk of indictment that it should feel free to advance legal fees to individuals in the face of the
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Thus, this Note argues that the language used in the McNulty
Memorandum allowed prosecutors to consider the corporation's waiver
of privileges in its indictment decision, which consequently perpetuated
the culture of waiver.
3. August 2008 Filip Guidelines
On August 28, 2008 the DOJ announced the implementation of
new guidelines for prosecution of corporate crimes.96 The DOJ revised its
guidelines as provided in the McNulty Memorandum due to criticism
from the American legal community and criminal justice system.97 The
newly announced policy provides further protection of the attorney-client
privilege as compared to the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda. The
new guidelines clearly state that cooperation credit should be given to
corporations for disclosing relevant facts to prosecutors regardless of
whether those facts are protected by the attorney-client privilege.98 Thus,
unlike the McNulty Memorandum, no positive credit is given to
corporations specifically for waiver of their attorney-client privilege.99
Furthermore, unlike the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda, the
guidelines are implemented in the DOJ manual instead of merely in a
Memorandum supplementing the DOJ's policy.1"
Although the newly announced Filip Guidelines attempt to
alleviate some of the problems created under the Thompson and
language of the Thompson Memorandum itself. It would be irresponsible to take the chance that
prosecutors might view it as 'protecting... culpable employees and agents."').
96 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16.
97 Id. ch. 9-28.7 10 (prefacing its change of policy with the comment that "the contention,
from a broad array of voices, is that the Department's position on attorney-client privilege and work
product protection waivers has promoted an environment in which those protections are being
unfairly eroded to the detriment of all").
98 Id. ch. 9-28.720 ("[T]he sort of cooperation that is most valuable to resolving
allegations of misconduct by a corporation and its officers, directors, employees, or agents is
disclosure of the relevant facts concerning such misconduct."). This policy is based partially on the
Report of the House Judiciary Committee that was submitted in connection with H.R. 3013, the
attorney-client privilege bill passed by the House of Representatives. Id. ch. 9-28.720(a). The portion
of the Report adopted by the Filip Guidelines states that
an entity that voluntarily discloses should receive the same amount of cooperation credit
for disclosing facts that happen to be contained in materials not protected by attorney-
client privilege or attorney work product as it would receive for disclosing identical facts
that are contained in materials protected by attorney-client privilege or attorney work
product. There should be no differentials in an assessment of cooperation (i.e., neither a
credit nor a penalty) based upon whether or not the materials disclosed are protected by
attorney-client privilege or attorney work product.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 110-445, at 4 (2007) (quotation marks omitted).
Id. ch. 9-28.720 ("Eligibility for cooperation credit is not predicated upon the waiver
of attorney-client privilege ....").
too DOJ, supra note 37 (explaining that instead of merely being included in a memo,
"[t]he r visions and policy changes announced today will be committed for the first time to the
United States Attorneys Manual, which is binding on all federal prosecutors within the Department
of Justice").
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McNulty Memoranda, the revised guidelines will not be enough to
remedy the problems existing under the current culture of waiver. Since
the DOJ has had five different policies in the past ten years for
prosecution of corporate criminals and the current policy can easily be
changed again by the next Deputy Attorney General who takes office," 1
corporations and corporate employees will be unable to rely on the new
policy. The culture of waiver will persist and employees will
consequently refrain from speaking with corporate counsel l02 because
there is a good chance that the DOJ policy for prosecution of corporate
crimes will be revised again in the future. This future change could allow
prosecutors to once more request information protected by the corporate
attorney-client privilege and to consider corporate disclosure of this
privileged information in determining the amount of cooperation credit
to give the corporation. Furthermore, even if corporations believe the
DOJ will not change its policy for prosecution of corporate criminals in
the future, there have been allegations that prosecutors ignored
provisions of the McNulty Memorandum and instead continued to
pressure corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege.0 3 Thus, a
change in DOJ policy might not be enough to prevent prosecutors from
continuing to pressure corporations to waive their privileges. °4
Moreover, there is evidence that because of the culture of waiver that has
been established through past DOJ policy and practices, corporations feel
obligated to waive their privileges even without DOJ demand to do so.0 5
Therefore this Note argues that the recent implementation of the Filip
Guidelines for prosecution of corporate criminals will not remedy the
current culture of waiver.
1II. DOJ POLICY OF PRESSURING CORPORATIONS TO WAIVE THEIR
AT-ORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE REJECTED
The DOJ policy and practice for prosecuting corporations or
individual employees for corporate crimes must protect those victimized
1 Companies Get Protected from DOJ Pressure, CFO MAG., (Aug. 28, 2008), at 7
(quoting the Coalition to Preserve Attorney Client Privilege as stating that "[tihe Justice
Department's track record of five different policies in ten years cries out for a permanent legislative
solution that cannot be revised at the whim of each new Deputy Attorney General" (quotation marks
omitted)); ABA President Wells Statement, supra note 23 (noting that the ABA President stated that
"[t]he Department's new guidelines are its fifth such policy in ten years and can be changed again at
any time").
102 See supra Part I.B.
103 Coyle, supra note 94.
104 See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 94 ("The behaviors ingrained pre-McNulty remain
ingrained post-McNulty and the memo hasn't removed those practices." (quoting Susan Hackett,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Association of Corporate Counsel)); McConnell,
supra note 94 ("Business groups say McNulty's revisions have not stopped prosecutorial abuses.");
McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 17 (statement of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block)
(stating that while the McNulty Memorandum is effective in theory, "individual prosecutors interpret
its factors markedly differently").
105 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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by corporate fraud and maintain investor confidence, while at the same
time protect individual and corporate rights. This Note argues that courts
should find pressured waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege by the
DOJ to be unconstitutional, as it fails strict scrutiny analysis and violates
the constitutional rights of both the corporation and the corporate
employees. Furthermore, even if courts do not find the DOJ policy and
practice of pressured corporate waiver to be unconstitutional, the policy
should be rejected because waiver of attorney-client privilege is harmful
to corporations, corporate employees, and shareholders, and it is
unnecessary as there are equally effective alternatives to obtain the
relevant information. Although the DOJ recently changed its policy in an
attempt to alleviate concerns of pressured waiver of corporate attorney-
client privilege, this Note argues that the culture of waiver will persist
and the DOJ's prior practice of pressured waiver of attorney-client
privilege could also continue under the new policy."°
A. Pressured Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Should Be Held
Unconstitutional
There is no current precedent concerning the constitutionality of
the DOJ's policy regarding corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege
as established in the McNulty Memorandum"0 7 or the recently announced
Filip Guidelines." This Note argues that courts should hold the DOJ's
policy and practice of impliedly pressuring corporations to grant waivers
of attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional, as it violates the
substantive due process rights of corporations and corporate
employees." 9 The court's decision in Stein I, which used strict scrutiny
analysis to hold the legal fees provision of the Thompson Memorandum
to be unconstitutional,"' supports this Note's argument that courts should
hold the DOJ's policy and practice of pressuring corporations to waive
their attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional.
1. Pressured Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Violates
Substantive Due Process Rights
The McNulty Memorandum established a system whereby
prosecutors were only permitted to request a waiver of corporate
106 See supra notes 86-88, 94 and accompanying text.
107 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8-11.
1o8 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.710.
109 Although the McNulty Memorandum was recently replaced by the Filip Guidelines,
which prohibit forced waiver of corporate privileges, the pressure on corporations to waive their
attorney-client privilege arguably might continue due to the culture of waiver, despite the revised
DOJ guidelines. See supra notes 87, 94.
110 435 F. Supp. 2d 330,366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
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attorney-client privilege for specific and rare purposes."' Despite this
system, due to the culture of waiver and pressure by the government,
corporations often feel obligated either to waive their attorney-client
privilege or to face indictment."2 This Note argues that courts should
apply strict scrutiny analysis to determine the constitutionality of the
DOJ's policy and practice of impliedly pressuring corporations to waive
their attorney-client privilege. Courts should apply strict scrutiny because
pressured waiver deprives the corporation and its employees of the right
to defend themselves and to a fair trial."3 If strict scrutiny analysis is
applied, courts should find this DOJ policy to be unconstitutional. "4
Strict scrutiny analysis should be applied to the DOJ policy and
practice of impliedly pressuring corporations to waive their attorney-
client privilege because pressured corporate waiver of attorney-client
privilege violates the constitutional rights of the corporation and its
employees."5 The Constitution protects individual defendants against
undue pressure to waive Fifth Amendment rights."' Although a
corporation is not protected by the Fifth Amendment, it is a legal
individual and must be protected against undue pressure to waive its
III McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8-11. However, the McNulty Memorandum
does not specifically state that a waiver may only be used in determining the level of cooperation of
the corporation when the refusal to waive obstructs the investigation. Id.
112 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
113 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
114 An additional reason for holding pressured waiver of attorney-client privilege to be
unconstitutional is that justice is not served by undue government pressure to waive the attorney-
client privilege. One might argue that the corporation is defended by a team of high-powered
lawyers, so it is highly unlikely that they will be unduly pressured into doing anything. However, the
fact that the defendant here is a corporation, instead of an individual, does not mean that the
government can treat it unfairly. The justice system provides the same protections regardless of the
perceived high level of counsel retained by the defendant. Another rationale for holding pressured
waiver of attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional is that the Stein I court found that
prosecutors abuse their power when they impose punishment before the defendant has been found
guilty. 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 ("The imposition of economic punishment by prosecutors, before
anyone has been found guilty of anything, is not a legitimate governmental interest-it is an abuse of
power."). Similarly, the court would likely find prosecutors are abusing their power by forcing
corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege to avoid indictment, before any finding of
wrongdoing by the corporation or its employees. See id. at 364 ("It would be irresponsible to take
the chance that prosecutors might view [advancing legal fees to individual employees] as
protecting... culpable employees and agents.") (internal quotation marks omitted). In Stein 1, the
court found:
[j]ustice is not done when the government uses the threat of indictment-a matter of life
and death to many companies and therefore a matter that threatens the jobs and security
of blameless employees-to coerce companies into depriving their present and even
former employees of the means of defending themselves against criminal charges in a
court of law ... the determination of guilt or innocence must be made fairly-not in a
proceeding in which the government has obtained an unfair advantage long before the
trial even has begun.
Id. at 381-83.
15 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (The government may not
infringe on a fundamental liberty interest "unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compellinf state interest." (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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rights.'"7 In addition, corporations and employees have a right to effective
counsel."' Pressured waiver of attorney-client privilege is comparable to
forced waiver of the corporation's right to effective counsel because
counsel cannot be fully effective in the creation of trial strategies and
arguments without all relevant information." 9 Although waiver of
attorney-client privilege will expedite DOJ investigations and might
make the prosecutor's job easier, these benefits do not justify placing
undue pressure on corporations and employees to relinquish their
rights,2 ° even if there is a "legitimate need for the privileged
information."'' The government expends extensive time and resources
for any large criminal investigation. Making an investigation easier for
the government does not justify violating the rights of an individual or a
corporation.
Government pressure on a corporation to waive its attorney-
client privilege also interferes with the individual employee's
constitutional rights to effective counsel and a fair trial.'22 The corporate
counsel represents the corporation and consequently owes a duty only to
the corporation, not the individual employee.'23 Thus, when an employee
speaks to corporate counsel, the employee's communications will be
revealed to the prosecution when the corporation waives its attorney-
client privilege unless the employee can prove that his discussions with
corporate counsel were in an individual capacity.'24 Proving that the
employee's discussions with corporate counsel were in an individual
117 See id.; EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 141 ("Unlike the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, which is not extended to a corporate entity, the attorney-client privilege
now may be asserted by a corporation ....").
118 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").
119 The Upjohn court found that "if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected" and "[a]n uncertain privilege ... is little better than no
privilege at all." 449 U.S. at 393. Thus, "if the purpose of the attomey-client privilege is to be
served," there cannot be a likely chance that the conversations between employee and corporate
counsel will not be protected. Id.; see also ABA Report on Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 51,
at 1037 ("If a client fears that information revealed to his attomey will be made known to others,
then the client will withhold information and the attorney will be left with less than all of the
information needed to provide competent legal advice.").
120 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
121 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8; McConnell, supra note 94 (reporting that
"[b]usinesses, along with civil liberties groups, complain that federal prosecutors have abused their
authority to file criminal charges as leverage to bully companies into waiving their Fifth Amendment
right to confidential communications with their lawyers").
122 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
123 The default rule is that corporate counsel is representing the corporation, not the
individual. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 164.
124 Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Therefore, even if the corporation does not
refuse to provide funds for the defense of the employee or otherwise pressure the corporation to
interfere in the individual employee's defense, as prohibited in United States v. Stein (Stein 1),
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008), DOJ pressure
on the corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege can still interfere with the individual
employee's defense.
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capacity is a very difficult burden to meet.' 25 As a result, if the
corporation waives its privilege and the employee cannot prove he
communicated with the corporate counsel in an individual capacity, the
employee's right to a fair trial will be infringed upon because his right to
an effective defense will essentially be waived for him by the
corporation. 126 The corporation's waiver of its attorney-client privilege
provides the government with confidential information and
communications regarding the individual, which the government would
not have obtained but for the waiver. Hence, the corporate waiver gives
prosecutors an unfair advantage over the employee-defendants and at the
same time deprives these employees of their constitutional rights to a fair
trial.2 7 and a defense free from government interference. 128
To be valid, waiver of an individual's rights must be made
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" by the individual.'29 In
waiving its attorney-client privilege, the corporation is essentially
waiving the attorney-client privilege for each individual employee who
cannot prove that his discussions with corporate counsel were in an
individual capacity. 3° Because the employee is not given a choice in the
corporation's waiver, the waiver of the employee's communications with
corporate counsel cannot be said to have been made "voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently."' 3 ' Therefore, courts should find that undue
pressure on a corporation to waive its privileges violates the rights and
protections afforded to employees by the Constitution, as it forces waiver
of attorney-client privilege by individual employees, without their
consent, for some communications between the employee and corporate
counsel.
Thus, this Note demonstrates that the DOJ policy and practice of
putting pressure on the corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege
125 Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
126 In Stein I, the court found that
Ujustice is not done when the government uses the threat of indictment-a matter of life
and death to many companies and therefore a matter that threatens the jobs and security
of blameless employees-to coerce companies into depriving their present and even
former employees of the means of defending themselves against criminal charges in a
court of law ... the determination of guilt or innocence must be made fairly-not in a
proceeding in which the government has obtained an unfair advantage long before the
trial even has begun.
Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381-82.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.").
128 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381-83.
129 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (waiver of right to remain silent).
130 EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 155.
131 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
interferes with the corporation's and corporate employees' right to a
defense free from government interference.'32 This interference by the
DOJ deprives the corporation and its employees of their constitutional
rights to defend themselves and to a fair trial.'33 As this is a violation of
the constitutional right of due process to fair proceedings,'34 courts
should apply strict scrutiny analysis.'35 To survive strict scrutiny, the
government must show that it had a compelling interest in the successful
prosecution of corporate crime and that government pressure to waive
the corporation's attorney-client privilege is narrowly tailored to achieve
this compelling interest.'36
The court in Stein I found that the government has a compelling
interest in "investigating and fairly prosecuting crime."'37 However, this
Note argues that even if the DOJ has a compelling interest in the
successful prosecution of corporations and corporate employees guilty of
wrongdoing, the government policy and practice of placing pressure on
corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege does not survive
strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest.
Pressured corporate waiver is not narrowly tailored to achieve
the government's interest in prosecuting corporate crimes because it will
have a chilling effect on the willingness of employees to speak to
corporate counsel about wrongdoing within the corporation and thus will
132 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357 (stating that government pressure on a corporation is
unconstitutional where it interferes with "the manner in which [the defendant] defends the case").
Furthermore, the employees' reluctance to speak with counsel would harm the corporation's ability
to determine wrongdoing of its employees and to fix, internally, the problems caused by the illegal
conduct.
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed .... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").134 Id.
135 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 361-62 ("The right to fairness in criminal proceedings is a
fundamental liberty interest subject to substantive due process protection."). The Stein I court held
that the "right to obtain and use in order to prepare a defense resources lawfully available to him or
her, free of knowing or reckless government interference" is a "right [that] is basic to our concepts of
justice and fair play. It is fundamental." Id. The Stein I court further held that
[by putting] pressure on KPMG to deny or cut off defendants' attorneys' fees.. .[,] the
government has interfered with the ability of the KPMG Defendants to obtain resources
they otherwise would have had. Unless remedied, this interference almost certainly will
affect what these defendants can afford to permit their counsel to do. This would impact
the defendants' ability to present the defense they wish to present by limiting the means
lawfully available to them.
Id. at 362. Therefore the court held "the Thompson Memorandum and the USAO's actions ... are
subject to strict scrutiny." Id.
136 Id. at 362. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must show it has a compelling
interest in acting as it did and that its act was narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling interest.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997) (The government may not infringe on a fundamental liberty interest "unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (,Voting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))).
Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
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actually impede the government's compelling interest. When a
corporation waives its attorney-client privilege, all communications
between individual employees and corporate counsel will be provided to
the prosecutors unless the officer or employee can show he consulted
with corporate counsel in an individual capacity. 38 If the culture of
waiver continues, employees and officers within the corporation will
refuse to speak with corporate counsel about wrongdoing within the
corporation because they will know that their conversations will likely be
turned over to prosecutors when the corporation waives its privilege.
Corporations will thereby have less information to provide to prosecutors
and will not be able to provide the facts underlying the confidential
communications nor direct prosecutors to certain witnesses.'39 Thus, by
pressuring corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege, the
government is actually impeding its ability to obtain relevant information
to meet its compelling interest in "investigating and fairly prosecuting
crime. '""'4 Therefore the DOJ policy of pressured waiver of corporate
attorney-client privilege is not narrowly tailored to meet the
government's compelling interest.
In sum, courts should find government pressure on corporations
to waive their attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional, as it does
not survive strict scrutiny analysis. Courts should apply strict scrutiny
analysis because the DOJ policy and practice of pressuring corporations
to waive their attorney-client privilege interferes with the corporation's
and corporate employees' rights to a fair trial and a defense free from
government interference. 4' Although the government has a compelling
interest in "investigating and fairly prosecuting crime," ' pressured
corporate waiver is not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest because
it creates a chilling effect on the willingness of employees to speak to
corporate counsel about corporate wrongdoing. Thus, pressured
corporate waiver has the effect of impeding the government's compelling
interest and, consequently, does not survive strict scrutiny analysis.
138 Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
139 Attorney-client privilege applies "only to communications and not to facts." Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (internal quotations and citations omitted) ("The
[attorney-client] privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure
of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney."). Thus, even if the
corporation does not waive its attorney-client privilege, it can still provide the prosecutors with the
facts underlying the protected communications. See id.
140 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (The government has a compelling interest in
"investigating and fairly prosecuting crime."). If the employees stop speaking with corporate counsel
for fear of corporate waiver of the attorney-client privilege, then the corporations will not even be
able to share these underlying facts with prosecutors. Consequently, prosecutors will be unable to
have the necessary information to investigate and fairly prosecute crime.
141 Id. at 357 (noting that government pressure on a corporation is unconstitutional where
it interferes with "the manner in which [the defendant] defends the case"). Furthermore, the
employees' reluctance to speak with counsel would harm the corporation's ability to determine
wrongdoin of its employees and to fix, internally, the problems caused by the illegal conduct.
Id. at 363.
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2. U.S. v. Stein Opens the Door to Legal Challenges to DOJ
Policy and Practices
The courts have already begun to find aspects of the DOJ policy
regarding prosecution of corporations to be unconstitutional. 43 The
court's ruling in Stein 144 was the first judicial strike against the
Thompson Memorandum. 45 In 2006, the court held part of the
Thompson Memorandum to be unconstitutional because it violated the
defendant's right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment 46 and
the defendant's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 47 In
finding as such, the court maintained that "due process requires fair
proceedings.''48 Although Stein I focused on the legal fees provision of
the Thompson Memorandum, it opened the door for legal challenges to
the DOJ's policy and practice of pressuring corporations to waive their
attorney-client privilege to avoid indictment.
49
The U.S. v. Stein case began in 2002 when the IRS issued nine
summonses to the KPMG corporation as part of an IRS examination of
KPMG's potential involvement in tax shelters. 5° The IRS claimed
KPMG did not fully comply with the summonses and consequently
brought suit to enforce them.' Prior to this matter, it was KPMG's
policy to advance and pay, without limitation, all legal fees for KPMG
partners and employees in any matter relating to "activities arising within
the scope of the individual's duties and responsibilities as a KPMG
partner, principal, or employee."' 52 As a result of the Thompson
Memorandum and United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") pressure in
this matter,'53 KPMG changed its policy to implement a $400,000 cap on
143 Id. at 382.
144 See id. at 362.
145 Taigue, supra note 76, at 374.
146 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The court in Stein I found that the Thompson
Memorandum and the actions of the United States Attorney's Office "were parts of an effort to limit
defendants' access to funds for their defense." Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366. The court also found
that "[e]ven if this was not among the conscious motives [of the DOJ], the Memorandum was
adopted and the USAO acted in circumstances in which that result was known to be exceptionally
likely." Id.
147 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367-73. Although the court in
Stein found the violation under the Thompson Memorandum, the McNulty Memorandum still
advocates prosecutors placing undue pressure on the corporation to waive its privilege. See supra
Part U.C.2. Thus the policy and principles behind the holding in Stein would still likely apply to the
McNulty Memorandum.
148 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
149 Taigue, supra note 76, at 390 (finding the court's decision in Stein I "pushed the door
open for future legal challenges to the most objectionable portion of the Memorandum: its heavy
emphasis on pressuring corporations under investigation to waive their attorney-client and work
product privileges").
150 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
151 United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2004).
152 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
153 A prosecutor's comments to KPMG counsel in this matter "[were] understood by both
KPMG and government representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees by KPMG, beyond
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the amount of legal fees it would pay for any individual, and to pay these
fees only as long as the individual cooperated fully with the
government." Furthermore, KPMG revised its policy to state clearly that
it would stop payment of all legal fees and expenses if the government
charged the recipient with criminal wrongdoing.'55
In Stein I, the court held that the government violated the
defendant's due process rights by pressuring the KPMG corporation to
refuse payment of attorneys' fees of potential employee defendants, thus
interfering with the defendants' choice of how to defend their case.'56 As
a defense, the government claimed that it did not force or even suggest
that KPMG create and implement a plan to refuse to pay attorney fees for
individuals who did not cooperate in the DOJ's investigation.'57
However, based on the Thompson Memorandum and the DOJ's
comments and behavior during its investigation, KPMG believed that full
and prompt cooperation mandated that it not pay legal fees for its
employees in order to avoid indictment.5 8 The court agreed and found
that the USAO purposefully facilitated KPMG's thinking in this
regard.'59 In addition, the court found this pressure from the government
to be unconstitutional,"' ° even though there was no official request from
the DOJ for the corporation to refuse payment of attorneys' fees for its
employees. 6'
any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well count against KPMG in the government's
decision whether to indict the firm." Id. at 344.
154 Id. at 345.
155 Id. at 345-46.
156 Id. at 357 (finding the government interfered in "the manner in which [the defendant]
defends the case"). The court in Stein found that the possibility of obtaining different counsel
without the assistance of the corporation was not sufficient to allow the government to put undue
pressure on the corporation to refuse to pay the attorney fees for the accused employee, and was not
sufficient for the corporation to refuse such payment. Id. at 369.
157 Id. at 351.
158 Id. at 353 (finding KPMG's decision to stop all payments of legal fees and expenses of
employees indicted by the government and to provide payments only to those who cooperate with
the government was "the direct consequence of the pressure applied by the Thompson Memorandum
and the USAO"). Furthermore, the court found that KMPG stood "to avoid a criminal conviction if it
live[d] up to its part of the bargain" which included "cooperat[ing] extensively with the government,
both in general and in the government's prosecution of this indictment." Id. at 349.
159 Id. at 352 (finding the USAO "deliberately, and consistent with DOJ policy, reinforced
the threat inherent in the Thompson Memorandum").
160 Id. at 365 (The actions of the individual prosecutors in the USAO "cannot withstand
strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause because they too were narrowly tailored to serve
compelling governmental interests.").
I d. at 353. The court found KPMG's decision "to cut off all payments of legal fees and
expenses to anyone who was indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to
indictment upon cooperation with the government was the direct consequence of the pressure
applied by the Thompson Memorandum and the USAO," even though the DOJ never explicitly
requested that KPMG change its policy in that way. Id. The court found that "KPMG refused to pay
because the government held the proverbial gun to its head. Had that pressure not been brought to
bear, KPMG would have paid these defendants' legal expenses." Id. at 336. Furthermore, the court
stated that the government "let its zeal get in the way of its judgment" and consequently "violated
the Constitution it is sworn to defend." Id.
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Soon after the court in Stein I partially dismissed the individual
employees' indictments due to the DOJ pressure on KPMG, the
employees moved for suppression of statements proffered to the
government during the investigation.'62 The court found some of the
employees' statements to be coerced and suppressed only those
statements.'63 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, which dismissed the indictment for all thirteen
defendants."6 The court held that the government violated the Sixth
Amendment by unjustifiably interfering with defendants' ability to
defend themselves. 1
65
Similar to this Note's analysis of government pressure on
corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege, the court in Stein I
applied strict scrutiny in reaching its decision." The court applied this
analysis because the Thompson Memorandum and the government's
behavior allegedly violated the defendant's substantive due process
rights to fairness in the criminal process by interfering with the ability of
the KPMG defendants "to obtain resources they otherwise would have
had" for their defense. 167 Under strict scrutiny analysis, the court held that
neither the guidelines established in the Thompson Memorandum, which
advised prosecutors to consider negatively a corporation's advancement
of legal fees to indicted employees, nor the government's exploitation of
KPMG's fear of indictment by pressuring KPMG to refuse payment of
legal fees for its employees, were narrowly tailored to the government's
goal of prosecuting corporations for criminal acts. 68 Thus, the court held
that it is unconstitutional for the government to pressure corporations to
stop payment of legal fees of their employees. 169 The court's rationale for
this decision was that individual employees have a right to choose their
counsel without government interference and that the government's
policy was not narrowly tailored to its goal of prosecuting corporations
for criminal acts.'70
162 United States v. Stein (Stein H/), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
163 Id. at 330-33.
164 United States v. Stein (Stein 111), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming the
dismissal of the indictment for the defendants "[because no other remedy will return defendants to
the status quo ante").
5 Id. As a result of the court's finding that the Sixth Amendment was violated by the
government's actions and "[blecause no other remedy will return defendants to the status quo ante,"
the court did not "reach the district court's Fifth Amendment ruling." Id.
166 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
167 United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 541
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) ("To survive strict scrutiny, government action must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.").
168 Id. at 364-65. The court partially based its holding that the DOJ guidelines were not
narrowly tailored on the fact that "the Thompson Memorandum does not say that payment of legal
fees may cut in favor of indictment only if it is used as a means to obstruct an investigation." Id. at
363.
169 Id. at 362.
170 Id.; see also supra note 167. The court further held that "the government may not both
prosecute a defendant and then seek to influence the manner in which he or she defends the case."
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The pressure felt by corporations to either waive their attorney-
client privilege or face indictment is similar to what happened in Stein I,
where the corporation felt pressure from the government to stop all
payments of legal fees and expenses of indicted employees or face
indictment of the corporation. 7' The court in Stein I found government
pressure on a corporation to be unconstitutional where it interfered with
"the manner in which [the defendant] defends the case."' 72 This reasoning
supports this Note's contention that courts should find forced waiver of
attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional because it interferes with
the corporation's and corporate employees' right to a defense free from
government interference. The DOJ's pressure upon the corporation to
waive its attorney-client privilege negatively affects the corporation's
defense because it will result in employees' refusal to speak fully and
frankly with corporate counsel.'73 This silence by corporate employees
will eventually result in the corporation's inability to provide any
information to the DOJ to assist in its investigation, as it will have no
information to provide.' Consequently, the corporation will not have
"cooperated" fully with the DOJ and will likely face indictment. In
addition, government pressure on corporations to waive their attorney-
client privilege will interfere in the defense of individual corporate
employees because the waiver will result in prosecutors obtaining
confidential information about the employee that can be used against him
if he is indicted.175
The court in Stein I held that the possibility that the corporation's
payment of a defendant-employee's legal fees would obstruct the DOJ's
investigation or signify a lack of full cooperation by the corporation is
Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357. "Nor may the government interfere at will with a defendant's choice
of counsel, as the Constitution 'protect[s] ... the defendant's free choice independent of concern for
the objective fairness of the proceedings."' Id. (quoting United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d
813, 818 (1st Cir. 1987) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
171 In Stein 1, the government did not "instruct or request KPMG to change its decision
about paying fees, capping the payment of fees, or conditioning the payment of fees on an
employee's or a partner's cooperation." 435 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (emphasis omitted). Thus, there is
even more clear pressure from the government in the cases of attorney-client privilege waiver, where
there is generally an actual request of waiver from the DOJ. In contrast, in the KPMG case, the
corporation simply felt pressure to stop payments, without any official request by the DOJ. Id.
Furthermore, even if the DOJ does not request waiver of privileges but the corporation merely feels
pressure to waive the attorney-client privilege, the rationale behind the court's findings in Stein I
would still apply. After all, KPMG felt pressure to refrain from paying attorney fees for indicted
employees, without any official request to do so by the DOJ. Id.
172 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
173 See infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
174 If the employees stop speaking with corporate counsel for fear of corporate waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, then there will be no communications or underlying facts in existence
for corporations to share with prosecutors. In contrast, if the attorney-client privilege remains intact
and employees thus continue sharing information with the corporation, the corporation can still
provide the prosecutors with the facts underlying the protected communications. Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (internal citations and quotations omitted) ("The [attorney-
client] privilege... does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated
with the attorney.").
175 See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
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not sufficient to justify government interference with the corporation's
policy of payment of legal fees for an indicted employee.'76 Using this
reasoning, courts should find the DOJ's justification of protecting
shareholders through quick and efficient prosecution'77  similarly
insufficient to justify the government's pressure upon corporations to
give up the important and long-recognized attorney-client privilege.
Accordingly, courts should apply strict scrutiny analysis to
determine the constitutionality of pressured corporate waiver of attorney-
client privilege by the DOJ. Using strict scrutiny analysis, courts should
find the DOJ practice of pressured waiver of corporate attorney-client
privilege to be unconstitutional, as it interferes with the substantive due
process rights of both the corporation and the individual employees.
Furthermore, this Note demonstrates that the court's decision in Stein I
supports the argument that an individual or corporation could
successfully challenge the DOJ's policy and practice of pressuring
corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege.
B. Pressured Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege is Harmful
Even if courts do not find the DOJ's pressure on corporations to
waive their attorney-client privilege to be unconstitutional, the DOJ's
practice of pressured waiver should still be rejected as harmful and
unnecessary. This Note argues that the DOJ's pressure on corporations to
waive their attorney-client privilege is harmful to the corporation, its
employees, and its shareholders.
1. Effect of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on the
Corporation
There are strong arguments in support of allowing the DOJ to
pressure corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege. However,
these potential benefits are outweighed by the negative effects pressured
waivers have on corporations. One argument in support of pressured
corporate waivers of attorney-client privilege is that fraud conducted
within corporations harms the average investor, and prosecutorial tactics
that pressure corporations to waive their privileges protect those
176 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369; see also United States v. Stein (Stein I/), 440 F. Supp.
2d at 338 ("It is no answer for the government to say that [the disputed] aspects of the Thompson
Memorandum are needed to fight corporate crime. Those responsible should be prosecuted and, if
convicted, punished. But the end does not justify the means."). Furthermore,
the fact that advancement of legal fees occasionally might be part of an obstruction
scheme or indicate a lack of full cooperation by a prospective defendant is insufficient to
justify the government's interference with the right of individual criminal defendants to
obtain resources lawfully available to them in order to defend themselves ....
Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
177 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.
[Vol. 74:1
2008] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL CASES 259
victimized by corporate fraud by facilitating the timely and cost-effective
punishment of those guilty of corporate wrongdoing.18 Also, the DOJ
has credited the recent increase in prosecution of corporate crimes to
corporate cooperation with DOJ investigations.7 9 This cooperation
includes waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege.' Moreover,
corporate criminal convictions have caused a "return of investor
confidence in the market"'' and have deterred further corporate
crimes. 182
At the same time, there are strong arguments against the waiver
policy, including the violation of the corporation's constitutional
rights.8 3 Even if the benefits from pressured waivers are valid, if
employees believe the corporation's attorney-client privilege will likely
be waived, employees will refrain from including corporate counsel in
decisions that could be crucial for the corporation." In addition,
employees will be less inclined to speak with corporate counsel about
anything even remotely related to the criminal wrongdoing for fear that
the conversation will not constitute a personal privilege and will
consequently be revealed to the prosecution when the corporation waives
its attorney-client privilege.'85 This could harm the investigation even
more than if privileges are not waived because it will encourage a culture
of silence among employees.'86 As a result of employees' silence,
corporations will eventually have little, if any, valuable information to
178 See Taigue, supra note 76, at 395 (addressing the argument that the DOJ policy of
requesting waivers of privileges is in place because "corporate fraud victimizes the average,
unsophisticated investor"); Tancabel, supra note 32, at 220; McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 14-
15 (statement of Michael L. Seigel, Professor, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of
Law) (arguing that "sometimes waiver is the only means by which [flederal investigators and
prosecutors can cut to the heart of the alleged corporate criminality in an efficient and timely
manner" and that public good is gained when, "[w]ith corporate cooperation, the successful
completion of a complex case can be reduced from a matter of years to a matter of months").
179 Tancabel, supra note 32, at 220.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 222.
182 Sen. Leahy Issues Statement on "Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud
Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum," U.S. FED. NEWS,
Sept. 18, 2007 [hereinafter Leahy Issues Statement] ("Aggressive prosecution of corporate fraud has
helped to reduce the culture of greed that devastated so many Americans [sic] financial security.").
183 See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
184 Tancabel, supra note 32, at 220. The Upjohn court found that "if the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected" and "[an uncertain
privilege.., is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393
(1981). Thus if the "purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served," there cannot be a likely
chance that the conversations between employee and corporate counsel will not be protected. Id.
185 Tancabel, supra note 32, at 220; see also ABA Report on Attorney-Client Privilege,
supra note 51, at 110 ("If a client fears that information revealed to his attorney will be made known
to others, then the client will withhold information ... .
186 See supra note 184.
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assist prosecutors in their investigation." 7 Thus, while protection of the
privilege will still allow valuable information, such as the facts
underlying the privileged communication, to be provided to
prosecutors, 8 ' forced waiver will prevent prosecutors from obtaining any
information from employees because the employees will remain silent
for fear of future personal harm. Moreover, without openness and
frankness from corporate employees, it will be more difficult, if not
impossible, for corporations to fully investigate and prevent future
wrongdoing by corporate officers or employees because the corporation
will lack the information necessary to do so.89 By impeding the
corporation's ability to learn about and rectify illegal conduct by its
employees, the corporation, including its employees and ultimately its
shareholders, 9o will be harmed. 9'
2. Effect of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Employees
In addition to harming the corporation, pressured corporate
waiver of attorney-client privilege negatively affects corporate
employees. Employees could lose their jobs when corporate employers
fire employees under suspicion of wrongdoing in order to appease
prosecutors.' 92 In addition, placing undue pressure on corporations to
waive their attorney-client privilege can result in waiver of individual
employees' confidential communications with corporate counsel.'93
Assuming the waiver of attorney-client privilege is voluntary,'94
some argue that corporations should be allowed to waive their attorney-
client privilege because individuals are permitted to waive their
187 See Tancabel, supra note 32, at 221 ("[E]rosion of the [attorney-client] privilege
inhibits frank communications between employees and company counsel and therefore deters
corporate compliance with the law.").
188 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 ("The [attorney-client] privilege only protects disclosure of
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated
with the attorney.").
189 Id. at 393.
190 Increased indictments of corporations will likely lead to a decrease in investor
confidence in corporations and also cause more corporations to shut down, which will consequently
have a negative effect on shareholders.
191 The crimes committed by employees in companies like Enron and Worldcom deprived
employees of their jobs and savings. McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 2 (statement of Hon.
Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator, State of Vermont) (crimes committed by employees in these
corporations "left a lot of employees without jobs but also bereft of their life savings, and it
devastated the shareholders ... to whom [those executives] owe a fiduciary responsibility"); see also
supra notes 2-3.
192 Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and
Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 341, 346
(2008).
193 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
194 One might argue that the corporation makes a conscious choice to waive the attorney-
client privilege in exchange for the DOJ's decision not to indict the corporation.
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privileges when they are indicted for crimes.'95 Prosecutors often allow
individuals indicted for crimes to waive their attorney-client privilege in
exchange for leniency in charging or punishment.'96 However, in contrast
to the corporate context, waiver by an individual is done voluntarily by
the indicted individual after weighing the costs and benefits of waiver. In
the corporate context, if a corporation waives its attorney-client
privilege, it simultaneously waives all privileged communications
between an employee and corporate counsel, unless the employee can
prove his communications with corporate counsel were in an individual
capacity.'97 In order for the employee or officer to prove his conversation
with corporate counsel was conducted in an individual capacity, he must
show that the substance of his conversations with corporate counsel "did
not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the
company."' 98
The burden of proof held by a corporate officer or employee to
show he was represented in an individual capacity instead of as an officer
of the corporate client is difficult to meet.' 9 This difficulty arises because
an individual employee or officer of the corporation will generally speak
to corporate counsel about topics within the scope of the employee's
duties.2°° The individual will consequently be prone to personal liability
because these communications will be revealed to the prosecution if the
corporation waives its attorney-client privilege."'
3. What about the Shareholders?
Pressured waiver of a corporation's attorney-client privilege can
harm shareholders as well. Shareholders put their faith, and often their
financial future, in the hands of the corporation. Corporations have a
195 McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 5-8 (statement of Karin Immergut, U.S. Attorney,
District of Oregon).
196 Steve Lash, Panel Weighs Law to Counter Privilege Policy, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Sept. 18, 2007 (quoting U.S. Attorney Karin Immergut, who argued that "[t]he notion that
prosecutors extend leniency in charging or punishment in exchange for cooperation is a concept
fundamental to our criminal justice system," and Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), who argued that
"[c]orporate defendants should not be treated different from other suspected criminals, who often
waive their attorney-client privilege to help investigators in return for reduced charges or a lighter
sentence"). Karin Immergut, U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon, argued that "efforts to further
restrict corporate waivers, such as Senate Bill 186" will not only diminish the prosecutor's ability to
protect victims and punish those guilty of corporate criminal acts, but they will also "establish rules
for the investigation of corporate suspects which are different from those applicable to every other
type of suspect." McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Karin Immergut, U.S.
Attorney, District of Oregon).
197 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
198 EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 157.
199 Id. at 158; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
200 EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 158.
201 .
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
duty to act in the best interest of their shareholders at all times.2"2 Thus,
one could argue that a corporation owes its shareholders full cooperation
with the government, including waiver of attorney-client privilege, to
ensure that those employees who have jeopardized the savings of the
shareholders will be punished and prevented from committing any future
harm against the shareholders' interests. However, while it is crucial to
prosecute those guilty of corporate crimes in order to protect the
shareholders and ensure the proper functioning of the market,2 3
protection of attorney-client privilege between attorneys and employees
of the corporation is necessary to protect shareholders' interests as well.
As argued above,204 if the employees know that the corporation
will likely waive its attorney-client privilege upon DOJ investigation,
they will be less likely to disclose to the corporation any potential
wrongdoing within the corporation. This lack of disclosure will impede
the corporation's ability to provide all relevant information to the DOJ so
that the DOJ can properly address the alleged wrongdoing. Therefore, the
current "culture of waiver"2"5 might eventually result in less successful
prosecution of individuals guilty of wrongdoing because the corporations
will not have information from employees that is sufficient to direct
prosecutors to relevant facts or witnesses.2 °" Failure to speak with
corporate counsel will also harm the corporation's ability to conduct
internal investigations and to change compliance programs to prevent
further criminal wrongdoing within the corporation in the future because
the corporation will not have the information necessary to do so.207 In
addition, the culture of waiver might result in more indictments of
corporations because the corporation will not have sufficient information
to provide to prosecutors in order to "cooperate" and avoid indictment." 8
202 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end.").
203 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1; see also The McNulty Memorandum's
Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2007)
(statement of Hon. Robert Scott, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security) ("[I]t is vital that prosecutors ... hold accountable wrongdoers who profit at the expense of
ordinary working Americans.").
204 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (holding that "if the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to be served," it cannot be probable that the conversations between employee and
corporate counsel will be unprotected).
205 Many argue the culture of waiver exists throughout the federal criminal justice system
and not just with corporations because individual defendants regularly waive privileges to obtain
leniency in prosecution or sentencing. See, e.g., McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 12-14
(statement of Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School).
206 Supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
207 The corporation's lack of ability to improve compliance programs would result from
lack of information from employees from which to investigate or act upon to prevent corporate
wrongdoing in the future.
208 See Tancabel, supra note 32, at 221 ("[E]rosion of the [attorney-client] privilege
inhibits frank communications between employees and company counsel and therefore deters
corporate compliance with the law."). Although there is a current increase in prosecutions, it is likely
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Increased indictments will likely lead to a decrease in investor
confidence in corporations and may also cause more corporations to shut
down, which will consequently have a negative effect on shareholders.0 9
Pressured corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege might
initially result in quick prosecution of individuals and thus be beneficial
to shareholders. However, this Note demonstrates that pressure on
corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege will, in the long run,
result in employees' refusals to provide important information to the
corporation. 20 As a result of the employees' silence, investigators will
not have as much information even if corporations do waive their
attorney-client privilege, and there will be fewer successful prosecutions
of individuals guilty of corporate fraud. Accordingly, pressured waiver
of corporate attorney-client privilege is not in the best interest of
shareholders.
Thus, this Note argues that the culture of silence that will result
among corporate employees due to pressured waiver of attorney-client
privilege will harm the corporation's ability to internally investigate and
remedy problems caused by the illegal conduct. The employees' silence
will also impede the ability of prosecutors to learn vital information to
successfully prosecute corporate officers and employees guilty of
wrongdoing. Therefore, this Note demonstrates that the DOJ policy of
pressuring corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege should be
rejected because it is harmful to the corporation, its employees, and its
shareholders.
C. Pressured Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege is Unnecessary
It is not necessary for the DOJ to pressure corporations to waive
their attorney-client privilege in order to meet its goals of obtaining fraud
convictions and restoring investor confidence. Rather, as the DOJ
acknowledges in its recently revised guidelines, 1 the DOJ can obtain the
information necessary to reach its goals without corporate waiver of
attorney-client privilege by ascertaining the facts underlying the
protected communications, speaking with witnesses, and exercising its
that these prosecutions will decrease as employees stop speaking with corporations in anticipation of
the corporation's waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying
text.
209 GRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 2 (observing that as a result of corporate crimes since
the Enron scandal, there has been "an unprecedented assault on the integrity of U.S. corporations
[and] . . . [niot surprisingly, the U.S. is suffering the effects of a considerable loss in investor
confidence and an even greater loss of trust in corporations and their executives").
210 See ABA Report on Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 51, at 110 ("If a client fears
that information revealed to his attorney will be made known to others, then the client will withhold
information and the attorney will be left with less than all of the information needed to provide
competent legal advice.").
211 Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, ch. 9-28.720 ("[Tlhe sort of cooperation that is most
valuable to resolving allegations of misconduct by a corporation and its officers, directors,
employees, or agents is disclosure of the relevantfacts concerning such misconduct.").
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rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.12 The protection of
attorney-client privilege is interpreted narrowly 213 and applies "only to
communications and not to facts. '2t4 Thus, even if the attorney-client
privilege is not waived, the DOJ will still have access to all non-
privileged communications and all facts underlying all privileged and
non-privileged communications.215 In addition, the corporation "can
direct the Government to documents and witnesses who will further its
investigation" without providing prosecutors with the privileged
documents themselves. 216 The DOJ can also interview relevant parties to
the case to determine the material facts, instead of pressuring
corporations to disclose the actual documents protected by attorney-
client privilege. 27 Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
allows disclosure of all non-privileged information, including documents
and tangible materials, where there is a showing of substantial need and
an inability to obtain the information without undue hardship.2 8
As a result of these alternatives to waiver of corporate attorney-
client privilege, the context and purpose of the communication, as well
as the events surrounding the communication, are not protected from
disclosure. 29 Accordingly, corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege
is not necessary because the DOJ has effective alternative means to
obtain sufficient information to successfully prosecute corporations and
individuals accused of corporate crimes. Although without corporate
212 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
213 EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 11; United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d
501, 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the attorney-client privilege "should be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits underlying its purpose"); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Harvey, 349
F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965) (finding attorney-client privilege "ought to be strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle").
214 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("The [attorney-client]
privilege only protects disclosure of communications, it does not protect disclosure of the underlying
facts by those who communicated with the attorney.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that
the protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is
one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The
client cannot be compelled to answer the question, "What did you say or write to the
attorney?" but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely
because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.
Id. at 395-96 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 830, 831 (Pa. D. &
C. 1962)).
215 Id.; see also supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216 McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 18 (statement of Andrew Weissmann, Partner,
Jenner & Block, New York, New York) (also testifying that although there were waivers in
connection with his prosecution of thirty individuals in the Enron case, the results would have likely
been the same even without the waivers).
217 Id. at 18. Although this will undoubtedly be more time consuming than having the
corporation simply provide all necessary information regardless of privileges, it is not so
inconvenient as to force the corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege.
218 FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Thus, the context and purpose of the communication, and the
events surrounding the communication, are not protected from disclosure. EPSTEIN, supra note 41,
at 13.
219 See EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13.
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waiver of attorney-client privilege the prosecutors will have to interview
the relevant parties to obtain the material facts, this extra effort is
minimal in comparison to the rights that would otherwise be violated by
undue pressure on corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege.220
This Note concludes that courts should find undue pressure by
the DOJ on corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege to be
unconstitutional as it fails strict scrutiny analysis and violates the rights
held by the corporation and the corporate employee. The DOJ policy of
pressured waiver should also be rejected because it is harmful. to
corporations, corporate employees, and shareholders. Furthermore, this
Note demonstrates that pressured waiver of corporate attorney-client
privilege is unnecessary as there are alternative means to waiver of
corporate attorney-client privilege for prosecutors to obtain the
information necessary to prosecute individuals guilty of wrongdoing
within the corporation.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT PRIVILEGES AND ALSO MEET
DOJ OBJECTIVES
There is no simple resolution to the issues discussed in this Note
regarding the pressured waiver by the DOJ of a corporation's attorney-
client privilege. A proper solution must balance the interests of the DOJ
in prosecuting corporations and corporate employees guilty of criminal
wrongdoing against the interests in protecting attorney-client privilege
and ensuring fairness to corporations and individual employees accused
of wrongdoing.22" ' This section will evaluate three potential means by
which to reach this balance. This Note proposes that the best solution is
legislation that expressly prohibits the government from requesting
corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege or from considering a
corporation's waiver of attorney-client privilege in deciding whether to
indict the corporation.
A. Legislation: The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of
2008
Legislation addressing the issue of pressured waiver of the
attorney-client privilege would be an effective solution to the issues
discussed in this Note. Legislation would allow the court to regulate
waivers of privileges, which would be more effective in preventing any
220 See supra Parts nl.A. 1, II.C.
221 McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 1-3 (statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, U.S.
Senator, State of Vermont). Although it is important to protect attorney-client privileges, the court
and legislature must be careful not to go too far. Id. Misconduct by corporations and its employees
"should not be given a safe haven or immunized from accountability." Id. at 2 (also arguing that
"[w]e do not want to go back to the dark days before Sarbanes-Oxley when we were subject to
corporate greed and actions taken in the dark").
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further infringement on the rights of corporations and their employees
than would be a change in DOJ policy.222 Furthermore, unlike a change in
DOJ policy, legislation would provide the necessary security to
corporations and their employees because it would establish more
permanent rules that prosecutors would be required to follow and that
would apply to all federal regulatory entities.223 This would ensure that
corporations and their employees would know what to expect if the
corporation is faced with potential corporate criminal liability, instead of
being subject to the changing policy of the DOJ.224 This Note will
demonstrate that The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008,225
which prohibits prosecutors from demanding, requesting, or conditioning
treatment of a charging decision on the disclosure of any communication
protected by the attorney-client privilege, would be effective in
remedying the persisting culture of waiver.
Senator Arlen Spector introduced to Congress The Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008,226 which passed unanimously in
the House committee. 227 The Act responds to the McNulty Memorandum
222 Legislation would be instead of the DOJ revising its own policy to protect the
corporations from forced waiver who, as evidenced by the changes in the McNulty Memorandum,
have not been very effective in preventing these forced waivers.
223 See ABA President Wells Statement, supra note 23 (stating that the Filip Guidelines
apply only to the Justice Department and "do[] nothing to change the similar policies adopted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, or the informal waiver practices of many other agencies").
224 Id. (ABA President H. Thomas Wells, Jr., stated that "the rights of American
employees and the businesses they work for are too important to be subject to constantly shifting
administrative policies. The Department's new guidelines are its fifth such policy in ten years and
can be changed again at any time.").
225 The legislation was introduced to the Senate on June 26, 2008. S. 3217, 110th
Congress (2d Sess. 2008). It was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Id. The
Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on November 15, 2007. H.R. 3013, 110th Congress
(1st Sess. 2007). The act was originally introduced by Senator Spector in 2006. Taigue, supra note
76, at 407. If passed, the bill "would have overturned portions of the Thompson Memorandum and
its policies." Id.
226 See supra note 225.
227 Abuse of Privilege, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2007, at A12. The Bill is supported by
several organizations and ex-DOJ employees, including the American Bar Association ("ABA"), the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), and Former Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh.
In endorsing the bill, the ABA said the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 "is
necessary to protect the communications between lawyer and client from potentially overzealous
prosecutors." Jerry Crimmins, U.S. Harms Attorney-Client Privilege: Survey, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
July 17, 2007. In supporting the Bill in 2006, the ACLU stated the "right of Americans to speak
freely and without hesitation to their attorneys is fundamental and vital to the court system."
American Civil Liberties Union Welcomes Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, supra note 39.
Thornburgh supports the Bill to protect privileged communications and argues that although the
DOJ, in deciding whether or not to indict a corporation, should take into account the corporation's
willingness to provide the prosecution with all possible relevant information, the corporation should
not have to reveal privileged communications for the DOJ to deem them cooperative in the
investigation. Lash, supra note 196. Thornburgh argues that the bill would address the flaws in the
McNulty Memorandum that threaten attorney-client privilege and would in no way impair federal
prosecutors from prosecuting individuals or corporations. McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 10
(statement of Dick Thornburgh, former U.S. Attorney General and Of Counsel, K&L Gates,
Washington, D.C.). Former Attorney General Thornburgh testified regarding the effect of the new
bill on the ability of a prosecutor to obtain sufficient information for a conviction as someone who
[Vol. 74:1
2008] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL CASES 267
by clearly prohibiting a prosecutor from demanding, requesting, or
conditioning treatment of a civil or criminal charging decision on the
disclosure by the corporation, or employee of the corporation, of any
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege.228 The Act also
includes a provision, however, that states that the government is not
prohibited from accepting a "voluntary and unsolicited offer" to share
confidential or protected materials.2 9
This proposed legislation differs from the McNulty
Memorandum, which allows prosecutors to take a corporation's grant of
waiver into consideration as an indication of corporate cooperation in the
investigation.23  Thus, if passed and followed by the DOJ, this new
legislation would balance the interests of the DOJ while still protecting
the attorney-client privilege, better than what was done by the McNulty
Memorandum. The Act would prevent prosecutors from putting any
undue pressure-explicit or implied-on corporations to waive their
attorney-client privilege. This type of legislation would undoubtedly
make it more difficult for prosecutors to build their case,2 1 but it would
also ensure full protection of the attorney-client privilege. In addition, in
building their case, prosecutors would retain access to materials held by
the corporation that were not protected by attorney-client privilege, and
they would have access to the underlying facts of privileged
documents.232 Furthermore, as the government would not be prohibited
from accepting a "voluntary and unsolicited offer" to share confidential
"either served as a Federal prosecutor [himself] or supervised other Federal prosecutors" for a "large
part of [his] professional career." Id. at 11. Thornburg further argued that a prosecutor must balance
the gathering of all relevant information from corporations while not forcing the corporation to
reveal privileged communications. Id. at 12.
228 H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Sess. 2007); S. 3217, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2d Sess.
2008). The stated purpose of the Act is "to place on each agency clear and practical limits designed
to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work product protections available to an organization
and preserve the constitutional rights and other legal protections available to employees of such an
organization." H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (1st Sess. 2007); S. 3217, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2d Sess.
2008).
229 H.R. 3013, § 3(a) ("Nothing in this Act is intended to prohibit an organization from
making, or an agent or attorney of the United States from accepting, a voluntary and unsolicited
offer to share the internal investigation materials of such organization."); S. 3217, § 3(a) ("Nothing
in this section may be construed to prohibit an organization from making, or an agent or attorney of
the United States from accepting, a voluntary and unsolicited offer to waive the protections of the
attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine.").
230 The McNulty Memorandum prohibits prosecutors from considering negatively a
refusal by the corporation to waive protection to privileged information, but the McNulty
Memorandum also states "[pirosecutors may always favorably consider a corporation's acquiescence
to the government's waiver request in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the
government's investigation." McNulty Memorandum, supra note 17, at 10.
231 McConnell, supra note 94 (reporting that Karin Immergut, a U.S. Attorney in
Portland, Oregon, "warned that stripping prosecutors of the right to consider confidentiality waivers
when deciding to bring charges or not could cause investigations to drag on for years").
232 The attorney client privilege is very narrow and does not protect the facts underlying
the protected communication. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981); see also supra
notes 213-214 and accompanying text.
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or protected materials,233 the corporation could provide specific
confidential materials to the prosecution if it deems them necessary for
the DOJ's investigation. As opposed to the pressured waiver under the
McNulty Memorandum, this provision would allow corporations to make
their own decision about what, if any, privileged materials should be
provided to prosecutors. The provision would also allow corporations to
obtain the input and consent of corporate employees that might be
affected by the corporation's decision to share protected materials with
the DOJ before the corporation waives its attorney-client privilege.
One might argue that if waiver of privilege never counts toward
the cooperation of the corporation, then corporations will have no
incentive to waive their privileges and thus will never do so. This is not
necessarily true, however, because corporations still have a fiduciary
duty to their shareholders to act in their best interest at all times.234
Accordingly, if the corporation believes that waiving part of its attorney-
client privilege will facilitate the investigation and punishment of those
involved in wrongdoing within the corporation, then the corporation
should waive its privilege even though it is not technically getting
"credit" from the DOJ for this waiver. Also, it is in the corporation's best
interest to provide all relevant information possible to prosecutors
because if their shareholders or members of the public, who are potential
shareholders, think that the corporation is being uncooperative, then they
will be less likely to invest in the corporation. Even if such a change in
legislation resulted in a corporation never waiving its attorney-client
privilege, the prosecution could still obtain the information necessary for
its investigation through other means.235
Although The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008
provides provisions similar to those in the newly announced Filip
Guidelines for prosecution of corporate crimes, the Act will provide
certainty to the corporations and corporate employees that the Filip
Guidelines cannot provide. The legislation will "ensure that the rights of
corporate defendants are respected," as opposed to the DOJ's guidelines
which could change at any moment.36 This Note argues that if the
233 H.R. 3013, § 3(a); S. 3217, § 3(a).
234 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end.").
235 See supra Part Ill.C. It might not necessarily be a bad thing if corporations never
waived the attorney-client privilege. As only a limited set of information is protected by the
attorney-client privilege, United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir.
1991), and the prosecutors can obtain the relevant facts underlying the protected communications,
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96, it might not be necessary for the attorney-client privilege to be waived
to facilitate the investigation. See also Parts I.A. 1, Il.C.
236 Debra Cassens Weiss, DOJ Announces New Corporate Guidelines that Ease Pressure
for Privilege Waivers, ABA J. LAW NEWS Now, Aug. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.abajournal.co/news/doj-to-announce-new-corporate-fraud-guidelines-today/
(referring to ABA President H. Thomas Wells Jr.'s statement in a press release regarding the new
DOJ guidelines announced Aug. 28, 2008, by Deputy Attorney General Mark R. Filip).
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corporation and its employees know the unreliable nature of the DOJ
guidelines, then the culture of waiver will persist since corporations will
never know when the guidelines for prosecution of corporate crimes will
change. Also, even if the culture of waiver does not persist, its negative
effects of causing corporate employees to stop speaking to corporate
counsel about wrongdoing within the corporation will continue since the
corporate employees will never know when the policy will change back
to allow pressured waiver of the corporate attorney-client privilege.237
Accordingly, this Note demonstrates that legislation should be
enacted to prohibit prosecutors from requesting waiver of corporate
attorney-client privilege or from considering any grant or refusal by a
corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege. Without such a
prohibition, the culture of waiver will persist and continue to be
detrimental to corporations, shareholders, and employees. 3 Although
revisions to the DOJ guidelines improve the current culture of waiver, no
DOJ guidelines that are implemented will provide the necessary security
to corporations because they can be changed at any moment, and they do
not apply to all federal regulatory entities.239 This Note argues that The
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008 would be an effective
remedy to the current culture of waiver as it would facilitate the
prosecution of those guilty of corporate wrongdoing while protecting the
attorney-client privilege. In addition, unlike any DOJ guidelines that
might be implemented, legislation will provide security to corporations
because it will make certain that the rights of those accused of corporate
crimes will be protected regardless of the guidelines used by the DOJ in
the prosecution of corporate defendants.
B. Revision of DOJ Guidelines
Another potential solution to the culture of waiver is the newly
announced DOJ guidelines for prosecuting corporate criminals.' 4 The
new guidelines adopt a portion of The Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act, passed in the House of Representatives, which states that
an organization that voluntarily discloses relevant facts to the
government to assist in its investigation should receive the same amount
of cooperation credit regardless of whether or not the facts disclosed are
protected by attorney-client privilege.24 Although these guidelines are an
237 See supra Part HB.
238 See supra Part L.B. Prosecutors could obtain evidence for the prosecution of
individuals guilty of corporate criminal acts without waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See
supra Part II.C.
239 ABA President Wells Statement, supra note 23.
240 See generally Filip Guidelines, supra note 16.
241 Id. ch. 9-28.720(a) ("[A] corporation should receive the same credit for disclosing
facts contained in materials that are not protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney work
product as it would for disclosing identical facts contained in materials that are so protected.").
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improvement from those provided in the McNulty Memorandum, which
allowed prosecutors to positively take into account waiver of attorney-
client privilege by the corporation, this Note argues that the new
guidelines will not be enough to cure the negative effects of the culture
of waiver created by the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda. Since the
DOJ guidelines have been changed various times in the past and can be
changed again at any time in the future with little or no warning, 42 the
implementation of new guidelines will not provide the security necessary
to remedy the negative effects of the culture of waiver. Furthermore,
unlike the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, which
would apply to all federal entities, the Filip Guidelines only apply to the
Department of Justice and not to other regulatory agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission or the Internal Revenue Service. 243
This Note argues that corporate employees will still refrain from
speaking to corporate counsel about potential wrongdoing within the
corporation for fear that the corporation will feel pressure in the future
from the DOJ or other federal regulatory entities to waive the
corporation's attorney-client privilege and thus likely disclose the
employees' conversations with corporate counsel.2  This will
consequently harm the corporation's ability to prevent future wrongdoing
within the corporation and to provide prosecutors with important facts
underlying the communications between corporate employees and
corporate counsel.245
Furthermore, the potential ineffectiveness of the revised
guidelines in remedying the culture of waiver is evident from the
persisting culture of waiver under the McNulty Memorandum, which
was implemented in 2007.2' There have been allegations not only that
prosecutors have blatantly ignored the provisions of the McNulty
Memorandum and demanded corporate waiver of privilege, but that the
DOJ has refrained from enforcing the rule in the McNulty Memorandum
that prosecutors may not demand waiver of attorney-client privilege as a
sign of cooperation.247 Therefore, as a result of the culture of waiver
created by the Thompson Memorandum and persisting under the
McNulty Memorandum, corporations could still feel pressure from
242 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
243 Bill McConnell DOJ Stiffens Client Protections, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 29, 2008 (quoting
David Weiner, former member of the ABA's standing committee on the federal judiciary as saying it
is problematic that only federal prosecutors are covered by the new DOJ guidelines, and that "[o]ver
the last 10 years we've seen the culture of waiver permeate throughout the federal government. We
need federal legislation that will make sure DOJ's new policies are comprehensive" (internal
citations omitted)); Filip Guidelines, supra note 16, at 21 (The principles in the Filip Guidelines
"provide only internal Department of Justice guidance" and "are not intended to, do not, and may not
be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
matter civil or criminal.").
244 See supra Part ll.B.
245 See supra Part l.B.
246 See supra note 87.
247 See supra.note 94.
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prosecutors to waive their attorney-client privilege or face indictment.
Simply because the DOJ announced a new policy does not mean the
prevalent culture of waiver will disappear.
C. No Prosecution of Corporations
Some have suggested reforming corporate criminal liability to
prevent the government from ever prosecuting corporations and instead
allowing the DOJ to charge only individual employees who committed
the crimes.248 This would alleviate the pressure corporations feel to grant
requests to waive the attorney-client privilege in order to avoid
indictment.249 However, changing the law such that corporations could
always avoid criminal liability would send the wrong message. The
reasoning behind corporate criminal liability is to hold corporations
liable for a more serious crime instead of having them face only civil
liability.50
Accordingly, this Note recommends that the most effective
resolution of the conflict between prosecuting those guilty of corporate
crimes and protecting the corporate attorney-client privilege is
legislation, such as The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of
2008, which prohibits the government from requesting corporate waiver
of attorney-client privilege and from considering a corporation's waiver
of attorney-client privilege in making its indictment decision. Although
the recent changes in the DOJ guidelines for prosecution of corporate
crimes are a step in the right direction, they will not be enough to remedy
the persisting culture of waiver or its negative effects. Merely telling
prosecutors what not to do regarding prosecution of corporations did not
work in the past, 251 so there is no guarantee that it will be effective now.
Legislation will be more effective in remedying the culture of waiver as
it will provide assurance to corporations and corporate employees that
the DOJ policy will not be changed again in the future to allow requests
to or pressure on corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, legislation such as The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act of 2008 will apply to all federal entities, as compared to the Filip
Guidelines, which only apply to the DOJ.252
248 Taigue, supra note 76, at 407.
249 See supra Part II.C.
250 New York Cent. R. R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (holding that a
corporation can be held liable for the crimes of its agents and officers when the corporation profits
by such transactions). "[Tlo give [corporations] immunity from all punishment because of the old
and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the only
means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at." Id. at
495-96.
251 See supra notes 87, 94 and accompanying text.
252 Companies Get Protected from DOJ Pressure, CFO MAG., Aug. 28, 2008, at 7 (stating
that although the new guidelines announced by Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip "are binding on
the DOJ, other federal entities, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, aren't required
to follow the new rule"); ABA President Wells Statement, supra note 23 ("Comprehensive
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V. CONCLUSION
The corporate crimes committed within Enron alone caused
employees and shareholders to lose billions of dollars.253 Successful
prosecution of corporate criminals is necessary to protect the public and
to restore confidence in the market. Since 2001, the DOJ's policy for
prosecution of corporate crimes has facilitated over 1200 corporate
criminal convictions. 24 These convictions have deterred others from
committing corporate crimes255 and restored investor confidence in the
market.256 Although successful identification and punishment of those
guilty of criminal wrongdoing is vital, it should not be achieved at the
expense of the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution.
The McNulty Memorandum was not sufficient to remedy the
culture of waiver, as it did not prevent the DOJ from placing undue
pressure on a corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege. Although
the recently announced Filip Guidelines are an improvement of the DOJ
policy for prosecution of corporate crimes since the Thompson and
McNulty Memoranda, they will not be enough to remedy the persisting
culture of waiver or its negative effects. Pressured waiver of attorney-
client privilege forces the corporation to reveal communications between
corporate counsel and the corporation's employees, and thus impedes the
corporation's ability to gain valuable information from employees to
conduct internal investigations and prevent further incidents.257 The
corporation's waiver of its attorney-client privilege will simultaneously
include waiver of confidential conversations between employees and
corporate counsel, without the consent of the employee, unless the
employee can prove her communications with corporate counsel were in
an individual capacity. 58 Therefore, this Note demonstrates that the
culture of waiver will eventually result in employees refusing to speak
fully and openly with corporate counsel because the employees will
know that their communications will likely be revealed to prosecutors
when the corporation waives its attorney-client privilege. Thus, if the
attorney-client privilege is not protected, corporate counsel will be
unable to learn all relevant information regarding an alleged crime. This
will inhibit the corporation's ability to both assist the DOJ in its
legislation is the only way to make the Department's reforms permanent, give them the force of law,
and apply them to all federal agencies.").
Alexei Barrionuevo, The Enron Verdict: The Overview; 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted
in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al.
254 McNulty Hearings, supra note 38, at 5 (statement of Karin Immergut, U.S. Attorney,
District of Oregon).
255 Leahy Issues Statement, supra note 182 ("Aggressive prosecution of corporate fraud
has helped to reduce the culture of greed that devastated so many Americans [sic] financial
security.").
256 Tancabel, supra note 32, at 222.
257 See supra Part 111.B.1.
258 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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investigation and increase effectiveness of corporate compliance
programs to prevent further misconduct within the corporation.
This Note argues that courts should use strict scrutiny analysis in
determining the constitutionality of pressured corporate waivers of
attorney-client privilege. 9 Using this analysis, and supported by the
court's reasoning in Stein I,260 courts should find the DOJ's policy of
pressuring corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege to be
unconstitutional. 26' Furthermore, this Note demonstrates that the DOJ
policy of pressured waiver should be rejected because it is harmful to
corporations, employees, and shareholders,262 and it is unnecessary, as
prosecutors have sufficient alternative means to obtain the information
relevant to their investigation.263
Legislation is the most effective way to strike a proper balance
between protecting the corporation's attorney-client privilege and
meeting the DOJ's goal of finding and prosecuting criminal conduct by
corporations and their employees. While the recent change in DOJ policy
on August 28, 2008 provides greater protection to the corporate attorney-
client privilege, it will not remedy the current culture of waiver. This
Note argues that corporations will still feel pressure to waive their
attorney-client privilege or face indictment of the corporation. This
distrust of the DOJ and corporate counsel that is being developed by
corporate employees could remain despite the recent improvement in
DOJ policy. 24 Even if corporations no longer feel pressure to waive their
attorney-client privilege, the negative effects of the culture of waiver will
persist because there is no guarantee that the DOJ will not change its
policy for the prosecution of corporate crimes again tomorrow to allow
pressured waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege. This Note argues
that this uncertainty will result in corporate employees' refusal to speak
with corporate counsel about any potential wrongdoing within the
company because they will know their communications will likely be
revealed to prosecutors when the corporation waives its attorney-client
privilege.2 65 This result will consequently inhibit the corporation from
preventing future misconduct within the corporation and from providing
prosecutors with important information for their investigation.266
Legislation would provide certainty to corporations and their
employees that the corporate attorney-client privilege will be protected in
the future and that the rights of the corporation and its employees will
259 See supra Part .A.1.
260 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); see also
supra Part 1.A.2.
261 See supra Part H.A.
262 See supra Part 11IB.
263 See supra Part I.C.
264 See generally Filip Guidelines, supra note 16.
265 See supra Part U.B.
266 See supra Part I11.B.1.
BROOKLYN LA W REVIEW
not be violated. Unlike the DOJ policy, legislation would also allow for
regulation by the courts and would apply to all federal entities. In
providing greater protection to corporations, legislation would thus allow
employees to speak at ease with corporate counsel. This would ensure
the protection of employee rights as well as allow corporations to gain
the necessary information from employees to conduct internal
investigations of corporate wrongdoing within the corporation. This Note
proposes that The Attorney-Client Protection Act of 2008 is a viable
option to both remedy the culture of waiver prevalent in DOJ corporate
investigations and protect corporate attorney-client privilege from DOJ
pressure to waive. Prosecution of corporate crimes is undoubtedly crucial
to protecting the public and maintaining investor confidence. However,
this need must be balanced with the right, protected by the attorney-client
privilege, of corporate employees to fully and frankly communicate with
corporate counsel.
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